

Sanitized Copy Approved for  
Release 2010/09/30 :  
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001

Sanitized Copy Approved for  
Release 2010/09/30 :  
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001

SECRET

CIS

101

SECRET

OCI No. 1863/57

SINO-SOVIET BLOC AREA  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
REFERENCE TITLE: POLO I-57

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

The Chinese Communist View of Intrabloc Relations

This study is a working paper. It outlines the evolution of the Chinese Communist movement to its unique position in the bloc. It notes Chinese reservations about certain features of the de-Stalinization campaign, and traces the development of a partially divergent Chinese line on Eastern European affairs. It offers evidence that Peiping has supported the Kremlin on most issues disputed with Gomulka and Tito but has supported those two leaders on certain important issues. It attempts to define the role which Peiping has played in helping to prevent a further deterioration, and possibly to repair some of the damage, in intrabloc relations. It speculates on the Chinese Communist course of action with respect to continuing problems in intrabloc relations. The study reflects information available to OCI as of 11 April 1957.

ILLEGIB

DDI/IRS

2/23

S E C R E T

## THE CHINESE COMMUNIST VIEW OF INTRABLOC RELATIONS

## SUMMARY

Mao's Road to Power, 1921-1935.....1

Some issues currently important in Soviet-Eastern European relations arose in the early days of the Chinese Communist movement. With Mao Tse-tung's establishment in 1935 as the party's leader, Chinese Communist organizational and tactical independence of the USSR was achieved.

Mao's Emerging Position, 1935-1948.....3

By 1945 the Chinese Communist view of the "road to socialism" had become clear. The Mao leadership intended to follow the Soviet model in building a new society, and to maintain a firm alliance with the Soviet party and state. At the same time, the Chinese intended to alter the Soviet model as they saw fit and to preserve their party's organizational integrity, in order to be allies rather than puppets of the USSR.

Chinese Denunciation of Tito, 1948.....5

The Chinese Communists endorsed the Cominform's expulsion and denunciation of Yugoslavia in 1948. The Chinese evaded the real issue in the dispute--the Soviet attempt to gain direct control of Yugoslavia--by condemning Tito for refusing his voluntary allegiance to the Kremlin. The Chinese at that time were more conscious of their own obligations to "proletarian internationalism" than of Soviet obligations to the concept of "equality" among Communist states and parties.

The Peiping Regime, 1949.....7

The People's Republic of China proclaimed in 1949 was essentially faithful to the Soviet model in its domestic program and was aligned with the USSR in foreign affairs. The Peiping regime differed sharply from the Satellites, however, in that it was not controlled by Moscow.

Communist China's Growing Stature, 1950-1953.....8

The Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 proclaimed principles for Sino-Soviet relations which are now publicized as the

S E C R E T

principles for relationships among all members of the bloc. The Peiping regime grew steadily in stature within the bloc in the period 1950-53, particularly due to the Chinese role in the Korean war. Developments in China did not follow the pattern of the Satellites.

Peiping's Rise to "Coleader" of Bloc, 1953-1955.....10

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the USSR and the Chinese took additional steps to enhance Peiping's prestige and to increase the regime's actual strength. Early in 1955 the Kremlin publicly elevated Peiping to the status of co-leader of the bloc, although Communist China clearly remained the junior partner.

Sino-Soviet Rapprochement with Yugoslavia, 1955.....11

In May 1955 Peiping and Belgrade finally exchanged ambassadors. In June 1955, in the interest of a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the Kremlin professed its adherence to Leninist principles in relations with all socialist states: equality, national sovereignty and independence, and non-interference in internal affairs. This was interpreted by the Yugoslavs and some others as recognition of Tito's right to pursue his own "road to socialism."

New Stimuli at CPSU's 20th Congress, February 1956.....14

Public and private statements by Soviet leaders at the CPSU's 20th Congress supported the view that Stalin's policies in intrabloc relations would be considerably modified, and had the effect of encouraging nationalist forces in the Satellites to press for greater modifications than the Kremlin envisaged.

Chinese Response to De-Stalinization, April 1956.....18

The Chinese Communists endorsed the de-Stalinization campaign, but with important reservations. Peiping seemed to feel that Stalin's actual contributions were being underrated, and that orthodox Marxism-Leninism was being undermined. The Chinese also declined to accept the Soviet implication that the post-Stalin Soviet leadership had ensured itself against making mistakes of its own.

Confusion and Evasion, June 1956.....20

In June 1956 the Kremlin made major concessions to Tito--on the verbal level--with respect to paths of

SECRET

S E C R E T

internal development and principles of party relations. At the same time, several Communist parties pressed for clarification of questions raised by Khrushchev's just-published speech of February. Moscow evaded the issues by asserting that there was "no foundation" for questioning the Soviet system as a whole, and by failing to discuss Togliatti's call for the "full autonomy" of Communist parties.

Soviet Anxiety, Summer 1956.....23

The Poznan riots marked the beginning of a Chinese Communist line on Eastern European affairs which in part diverged from the Kremlin's line. Peiping agreed, however, with the Kremlin's insistence throughout summer 1956 that its various conciliatory statements and actions did not justify any Communist state in taking a Titoist course. In September, Peiping first stated its two-sided warning against "great-nation chauvinism" (of the USSR) and "bourgeois nationalism" (in Eastern Europe).

Chinese Support of Gomulka, Fall 1956.....26

Peiping's news coverage of the Polish party plenum in October strongly suggested Chinese favor for Gomulka. The Poles may have exaggerated, however, the amount of support they could expect from Peiping.

25X1

Soviet Declaration of 30 October 1956.....28

The Soviet declaration of 30 October affirmed the Kremlin's allegiance to Leninist principles in intrabloc relations (essentially those affirmed in the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement of June 1955), and promised to take action to correct past mistakes. The Chinese Communists immediately endorsed the statement, but criticized past Soviet policies more strongly than had the USSR itself.

Solidarity on Hungary, November 1956.....29

After joining the USSR in warning Hungary not to become a non-Communist state, Peiping immediately endorsed the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. This was consistent with Peiping's advocacy of greater freedom for Communist states within the bloc.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Reaffirmation of Peiping's Position, November 1956.....31

In November, Peiping reportedly assured the Gomulka government of continued support for the Polish position on relationships with the USSR. Peiping hailed the Soviet-Polish agreement of 18 November as a "vivid example...of proper relations between socialist countries." The Chinese reiterated that Leninist principles might again be violated, observed that not all mistakes had been corrected, and specified that "great-nation chauvinism" was the "main" problem.

Renewal of Yugoslav-Soviet Dispute, November 1956.....32

Tito in his Pula speech accused the Soviet leadership of failing to modify appreciably the Stalinist internal system, and of persisting in a Stalinist course in intra-bloc relations. The Kremlin denied both charges. Peiping remained silent until late December.

Peiping's Definitive Position, 29 December 1956.....35

Peiping's definitive statement of 29 December on intra-bloc relations was an emphatic self-assertion by the Chinese Communist leadership as a source of guidance for all members of the bloc. The statement called for subordination of continuing problems in intrabloc relations to the demands of the bloc's struggle against the West. Peiping defended the Soviet system and agreed with the Soviet position on the essential features of a Communist state, thus denying Tito's Yugoslavia the name of a Communist state and warning other Eastern European leaders (particularly Gomulka) that Peiping had no sympathy for "national Communism." However, the Chinese specified, in partial agreement with Tito and Gomulka, that Communist parties should maintain their "independence," and that unity should be achieved voluntarily, with recognition of "equality," and "genuine, not nominal, exchange of views." The statement again warned against both "great-nation chauvinism" (of the USSR) and excessive nationalism (in Eastern Europe). Moscow clearly regarded the statement as very useful, especially at that time, but probably did not wish to have it taken as a fully authoritative account of the Kremlin's own position.

Situation Before Chou's Trip, January 1957.....41

In sending Chou En-lai to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest, Peiping hoped to help to prevent any further deterioration

S E C R E T

in intrabloc relations. Peiping shared with Moscow the immediate objective of arresting or reversing Gomulka's course. The Chinese also believed, however, that certain problems were presented by Soviet behavior. In Chinese eyes if not in Moscow's, Chou's role was to be that of conciliator and moderator, helping to keep quarrels in the family while urging all parties to work out their problems quietly and gradually. Chou was expected to emphasize, in talks with Eastern European leaders, Peiping's advocacy of orthodoxy and unity, and, in talks with Soviet leaders, the room for improvement in Soviet treatment of other Communist states and parties.

Chou's Trip, January 1957.....46

The communiq s published during Chou's trip emphasized areas of agreement and minimized areas of disagreement. On the continuing problems in intrabloc relations, they suggested a wide difference between Warsaw and Peiping, a wider difference between Warsaw and Moscow, and some difference between Peiping and Moscow. The Warsaw communique indicated that Chou may have influenced Gomulka toward moving closer to the Kremlin. The Moscow communique and other statements showed some Soviet accommodation to the Chinese view on the stature of Stalin, on the error of "great-nation chauvinism," and on the desirability of the independence of Communist parties. The most important visible effect of Chou's trip was the emphatic commitment of Chinese prestige to Soviet observance of Leninist principles in intrabloc relations.

Developments Following Chou's Trip.....52

Since Chou's departure from Moscow on 18 January, several developments have shown that the problems in intrabloc relations to which the Chinese addressed themselves remain very much alive. A moderating influence by Peiping may be reflected in certain conciliatory measures taken by both Gomulka and the Kremlin. There has as yet been no evidence, however, of Chinese influence in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute or in Soviet relations with the six reliable Satellites.

Chinese Communist Course of Action.....56

The Chinese Communists clearly intend to play a continuing role in intrabloc relations, apparently in the belief that they can contribute to the gradual resolution of most if not all outstanding problems. Moscow can almost

**SECRET****S E C R E T**

certainly rely on the Chinese to contend, in their talks with the Yugoslavs and Poles, that the proper use of Belgrade's freedom and Warsaw's more limited freedom lies in voluntary adherence to the "laws" of Communist states, particularly "proletarian internationalism" around the USSR. However, Peiping may be somewhat more sympathetic than Moscow to Gomulka's internal problems, and increased Chinese contacts with Poland may conflict with a Soviet effort to bring Gomulka down. Similarly, increased Chinese contacts with Yugoslavia may conflict with a Soviet attempt to isolate Belgrade, and Peiping may advise the Yugoslavs against taking actions--tending to promote isolation--which Moscow may hope they will take. Perhaps the Chinese will take up these matters directly with the Kremlin. There seems a smaller possibility of Chinese representations on behalf of the six Satellites, or of Chinese pressure on Moscow to make changes in the leadership of the Satellites. In any case, there is a new factor--the Chinese Communists--in Eastern European affairs, and the Kremlin can have no assurance that Peiping will play its role in the manner Moscow would wish.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**Mao's Road to Power, 1921-35

In the early years of the Chinese Communist movement, the Comintern--through Soviet representatives in China and Moscow-trained Chinese--imposed on the young party unsuccessful programs for seizing power.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) collaborated with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist party (Kuomintang) from 1924 to 1927, at which time Chiang, correctly believing that the CCP sought total power, broke off the alliance. Chen Tu-hsiu, Secretary-General of the CCP, was selected as the scapegoat, accused of "right opportunism," deposed and later expelled. Mao in this period was just beginning to lay out the Mao "road."

Chen Tu-hsiu was succeeded as party leader by Chu Chiu-pai, who briefly presided over three major failures of a new militant line. These, occurring in the latter half of 1927, were the Communist attack on Changsha, the Mao-led peasant uprisings in Hunan, and the attempt to set up a Canton Commune. A scapegoat was again required, and Chu was denounced as a "left deviationist" at the CCP's 6th Congress in 1928.

Mao was re-elected to the CCP's central committee at that 1928 congress, and the congress endorsed Mao's program among the peasantry as one line of action among others. The overall program endorsed by the congress, however, was one for which Li Li-san rather than Mao was the principal spokesman.

By 1930 the Comintern's belief in a new "revolutionary upsurge" had grown strong, and Li Li-san, de facto leader of the party, was pressed to resume a violent program. Again Changsha was attacked, and again the effort failed. Again a scapegoat was needed, and again "left deviationism" was the charge. Li Li-san was finally ousted in January 1931, following a denunciatory letter from the Comintern.

Mao in that period was not among the CCP's "central authorities" in Shanghai, but was instead building the Kiangsi Soviet in South China as the nucleus of a movement to be based on peasant armies. In December 1930, Mao moved to break his opposition in the Kiangsi Soviet. The issues do not seem to have been the main aspects of the "road to socialism"--i. e., the nature of the internal program, and the nature of the relationship with the USSR. The main factor in the 1930 purge was apparently the principle of political dominance of the military, a principle which Mao has repeatedly affirmed.

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

Li Li-san was succeeded as the real leader of the CCP "central authorities" by Chen Shao-yu, then the dominant figure among the "28 Bolsheviks" who had returned to China in 1930 after years of study in the USSR. Chen, who had tried to get Li to adopt a more militant line, replaced Li in 1931, and accompanied the other CCP "central authorities" from Shanghai to Mao's Kiangsi Soviet late in 1931, but was sent to Moscow in 1932. One official CCP history of the period indicates that Chen fell because he opposed Mao on the question of "building revolutionary power" (i.e., building up the Kiangsi Soviet) and also opposed Liu Shao-chi on the question of using legal forms of action in the cities (i.e., building up Communist strength in urban organizations, primarily trade unions, for co-ordinated action with military forces later.)

Just as the CCP's "central authorities" had not controlled Mao's Kiangsi Soviet when they were in Shanghai, so Mao could not control them after their removal to Kiangsi. The period from September 1931 to January 1935 is described by Chinese Communist sources as that of the "third leftist line." A CCP leader of that period states that real power was then in the hands of Po Ku (deceased) and Chou En-lai, and that Mao was regarded as pursuing a narrow "countryside policy." Po and Chou, like earlier leaders, were apparently taking orders from the Comintern; the same source says that the Long March was decided on in the fall of 1934 after advice by radio from Moscow. (1)

The Tsunyi conference in January 1935, during the Long March, established Mao's "leading position in the central organs and in the party as a whole," according to Chinese Communist sources. With support from other leaders, Mao successfully attacked the positions of Po and Chou.

With Mao's ascendancy in 1935, three critical policy issues had been resolved. It was established that: (a) Chinese Communist strategy and tactics were to be devised primarily by the Chinese themselves, rather than imposed by Moscow; (b) the Chinese Communist movement was to be based primarily on the peasantry, rather than on the urban proletariat as Soviet dogma had demanded; and (c) the CCP's peasant armies were to consolidate a rural base which could later be expanded, rather than to attempt to capture major cities as the Kremlin had once wished. The Comintern, whether or not enthusiastically, endorsed Mao and Mao's program the same year.

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**Mao's Emerging Position, 1935-1948

During the next ten years after the establishment of Mao's leadership, the Chinese Communist view of the "road to socialism" took shape along lines it has retained ever since. By 1945 the Mao leadership had committed itself to follow the Soviet model in constructing a new society, and to maintain a close alliance with the Soviet party and state. At the same time, Mao and his lieutenants signified their intention to alter the Soviet model as they saw fit, and to preserve their party's integrity--i.e., its organizational freedom from Soviet control--in order to have a genuine alliance with the USSR rather than a satellite relationship. In the years since 1945, the failure of many observers to keep their eyes on both of these features of Chinese Communism has led to miscalculations in two directions. Failure to recognize the strength of the CCP's commitment to the USSR led many Chinese liberals to collaborate with the CCP and some Western observers to believe that the Peiping regime could easily be split from Moscow; there are still those who think that Peiping is imminently "national Communist." On the other hand, failure to recognize the CCP's organizational integrity and tactical freedom has led some observers to regard Peiping as a simple satellite, and to assume that there could not possibly develop any divergencies or disputes between the Russians and Chinese.

In 1939 the CCP published two major documents on the indoctrination of party members, one by Chen Yun (now fifth-ranking in the official hierarchy), the other by Liu Shao-chi (now second-ranking), who thereafter replaced Chen as Mao's main spokesman for party affairs. Both documents affirmed the Mao leadership's intention to maintain the Leninist character on the party, with its emphasis on centralism. Both expressed the Communist faith in ultimate triumph, which would require recognition of Soviet leadership in the world struggle. (Liu's article stated explicitly that "the national interest is subordinate to the international.")

In 1940, Mao published his "New Democracy," which was apparently aimed primarily at seducing Nationalist and uncommitted Chinese leaders. Even in this conciliatory article, however, Mao stated his view that the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution, not predominantly a nationalist movement, and that the Soviet state would become "the ruling form of the world."

**SECRET**

In 1942-1943 Mao led an "ideological remolding" movement directed against, on one hand, unorthodoxy, and, on the other, excessive orthodoxy. Unorthodoxy was mainly expressed as Western liberalism, for which Mao and his lieutenants had and have no sympathy. Excessive orthodoxy--that is, dogmatism--was expressed as a failure to see the need for adapting Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, such adaptation being, in Mao's view, the best kind of Marxism. Mao's targets were apparently some of the "young Bolsheviks" who prided themselves on their ideological knowledge. In any case, Mao in his articles derided the mere parrots of Marxist theory, and observed that an inflexible dogma is "less useful than cow dung."

Mao's report of 1945, "On Coalition Government," seemed to be aimed, like his 1940 statement, primarily at allaying suspicions. Again Mao affirmed, however, that the party's "future or ultimate" program would "beyond question" be that of directing China "forward to Socialism and Communism."

Delivering another report on party strategy and tactics in December 1947, at which time Chinese Communist forces had begun to go on the offensive, Mao sketched out his plan for the Communist-controlled regime to be established. The plan called for a united-front government with a gradualist program in domestic affairs, a regime which would unite with all "democratic forces," headed by the Soviet Union, against "imperialist" forces headed by the United States.

What little material is available on relations between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties in the period 1935-1948 supports the view that the Chinese maintained a cordial and co-operative relationship with the Russians while devising their own domestic program and maintaining their organizational integrity. During World War II, the Chinese were apparently keeping Moscow as well-informed as possible on major military and political developments, but Chinese actions seem to have been taken at their own initiative and not in response to Soviet directives. American observers in Yenan at that time found no Soviet liaison officers, merely two physicians.(2) There was unquestionably Soviet and Chinese Communist co-operation immediately after World War II, when Chinese Nationalist forces were prevented by the Soviets from occupying Manchuria on schedule, and Soviet forces withdrew on a schedule which permitted Chinese Communist forces to occupy many important areas and to "capture" large stores of materiel (mostly Japanese). The CCP was apparently careful, however, to keep control of its personnel studying in the USSR and working with the Russians. For example, Chinese personnel

working with the Soviet army in Manchuria were under the jurisdiction of the CCP's Northeast Bureau rather than the Soviet Army. (3)

CCP Denunciation of Tito, 1948

The Chinese Communist Party was not represented on the Cominform established in 1947. Soon after the Cominform's expulsion of Yugoslavia in 1948, however, the CCP endorsed the action. The CCP central committee echoed the Cominform's charge that Tito's program was a "betrayal" of Marxism-Leninism and a regression to "bourgeois nationalism." Later in 1948, in a long article entitled "Internationalism and Nationalism," Liu Shao-chi authoritatively stated the Chinese Communist position on intrabloc relationships. Liu has been the regime's principal spokesman on this question ever since.

Liu's article stated that there was "considerable misunderstanding and confusion" inside and outside of the CCP on the matter of "proletarian internationalism as opposed to bourgeois nationalism." Liu's task was essentially that of making clear to the party membership the party's intention to remain faithful to the USSR while preserving its status as a brother party rather than a Soviet creature. There were probably nationalist elements in the CCP who were unhappy about the first half of the proposition, and probably some--oriented to Moscow rather than to Mao--who were unhappy about the second half.

Liu, following Soviet theorists, argued that bourgeois nationalism subordinates the interests of the nation as a whole to the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and strives to dominate, oppress and exploit other nations. The "most vicious manifestation" of this attitude, at the time of Liu's writing, was said to be "the schemes for enslavement of the whole world by the international imperialist camp, headed by American imperialism."

In contrast, Liu wrote, the proletarian internationalist approach represents the interests of the masses of every nation, "the basic interests of all mankind," and thus opposes all forms of national oppression. The CCP, Liu said, subscribed to the proposition of "complete equality of all nations--large or small, strong or weak," and advocated the "voluntary association and voluntary separation of all nations." In sum, Liu denounced Tito for refusing his voluntary allegiance to the Kremlin.

ILLEGIB

The CCP, on the basis of its own formulas, should properly have sympathized with Tito. Tito was entirely willing, and remained for some time willing, to be allied with Moscow. The real issue in the dispute was the Soviet effort to transform Yugoslavia into a simple satellite. Liu evaded this issue in the following fashion:

"...Communists will be betraying the proletariat and Communism and playing the game of imperialists all over the world...if...the Communists descend to a position of bourgeois nationalism, carrying out a policy of national selfishness and sacrificing the common international interests of the working people and proletarian masses of all the nations of the world;...if they not only fail to oppose imperialism but even rely on imperialist aid...; or if they employ national conservatism and exclusive ideas to oppose proletarian internationalism... The Tito clique in Yugoslavia is now taking this path."

Liu went on to provide a strategic justification for the CCP's denunciation of Tito. In one camp he placed the USSR--"the leader of all the peoples in the world"--and Communist states and Communist-controlled portions of countries in Europe and Asia--a total of 500,000,000 people, an encouraging figure. The figure was small, however, in comparison with the 1,300,000,000 people outside the United States "directly or indirectly under the single domination of American imperialism." (The concept of a great uncommitted bloc had not been developed at that time). The "betrayal of the Tito clique" had thus weakened the Communist camp when it needed all the strength it could muster.

There is little doubt that the Chinese Communists were more conscious in 1948 of their own obligations to "proletarian internationalism" than of the Soviet obligation to the concept of "equality." As noted above, the Chinese formulas were not applied honestly to the Yugoslav situation. Moreover, they were not applied consistently even to China. At that time a Chinese writer and editor in Manchuria, Hsiao Chun, incensed by the Soviet stripping of Manchuria in 1945-46 and the boorish behavior of Soviet officials and troops subsequently, published an editorial denouncing "imperialists of all colors" and calling upon all Soviet personnel to treat the Chinese genuinely as allies. Hsiao was removed from his positions and re-emerged only in 1955, having discovered in the interval that he had been mistaken in thinking that the USSR could ever be guilty of imperialism.

The Peiping Regime, 1949

Mao Tse-tung restated the main points of the Chinese Communist world-view, and the intentions of the forthcoming Peiping regime, in an article on "The People's Democratic Dictatorship" in July 1949. Mao asserted that Marxism-Leninism is a "universal truth...which holds good everywhere," and promised that his regime would "travel the road of the Russians."

Mao reaffirmed his position that "To sit on the fence is impossible. A third road does not exist." Mao argued that the Chinese Communists could neither win their victory nor preserve it without Soviet aid. Such aid would be essential to avert the threat of "international reactionary forces" and to secure the material goods and technical services which the Chinese did not have. Addressing those in the CCP who might have wished to obtain Western aid--either to simplify the regime's problems or as a hedge against the USSR--Mao said that it was "childish" to think Western aid feasible, and that "genuine friendly aid" could come only from the bloc.

Mao made clear that the Peiping regime would be a genuine dictatorship by the Communist party, in the name of the "people over the "reactionaries." The "people" were defined as the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie (businessmen regarded as not primarily the servants of foreign capital); the "reactionaries," were defined as mainly the landlord and "bureaucratic capitalist" classes. (The Soviet concept of "friendly classes" recognizes only workers, peasants, and laboring intelligentsia.) The government was to be highly centralized and as coercive as necessary. It was to proceed gradually with the socialization of the economy, adopting a policy of restricting rather than eliminating capitalism. In foreign policy, it would "unite with international revolutionary forces."

While the concept of "people's democratic dictatorship" was original with Mao, the Peiping regime--proclaimed in October 1949--was faithful to the Soviet model in its essentials. Moreover, Mao's program did not differ greatly in its domestic aspects from the one worked out for the Eastern European states. In both cases the regimes included "patriotic" bourgeoisie, (although this was a much larger class in China), maintained docile non-Communist parties, saw the necessity of a mixed economy for some time, and planned to avoid

**SECRET**

the fierce "class struggle" of the Soviet transition. There was one critical difference, however, between the Peiping regime and all of the Eastern European states except Yugoslavia: the Satellites were controlled by Moscow, and Peiping was not. For Peiping, Soviet leadership meant just that, not Soviet manipulation of a puppet.

### China's Growing Stature, 1950-1953

It is not known whether Stalin at any time considered attempting to transform Soviet influence over the Chinese Communists into Soviet control of the movement. If so, he had almost certainly decided against it by the time the Peiping regime was established in October 1949.

In December of that year, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai headed a delegation to Moscow which thereafter spent two months negotiating the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950. The treaty was not one between genuine "equals," but it illustrated Communist China's position as much superior to that of the Eastern European Satellites, and it laid the foundation for a steady growth in Communist China's stature in the bloc over the next few years.

The treaty stated that the two governments intended to co-operate "in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual interest, and also respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of the other party...." Obviously, Soviet profession of these principles did not guarantee Soviet adherence to them. However, none of the Soviet-Satellite treaties of that period contained such strong statements. None mentioned "equality and mutual benefit"; only the Polish treaty mentioned "territorial integrity," and only the Hungarian treaty mentioned "national sovereignty." The principles of the Sino-Soviet treaty—with the addition of "national independence" and, sometimes, of "non-aggression"—were later to be given much publicity by both Moscow and Peiping as the model for relationships among all states of the bloc.

The Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950 gave Peiping a Soviet military commitment against the West (in the guise of a guarantee against a Japanese attack), provided for substantial economic and advisory aid to the Chinese, and took a step toward liquidating the USSR's special privileges in China. The most important of these provisions were for Peiping eventually to regain control over railroads and enterprises in Manchuria over the Port Arthur-Dairen area there.

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

There is no evidence that the Kremlin attempted, counter to the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty, to reduce the Peiping regime to a simple satellite. Even if Stalin had wished to do so, the necessary conditions for such an effort were not present.

The Chinese party had been developed by, and had been cohesive under, native leaders for many years, owed its triumph primarily to its own efforts, and had a strong sense of national as well as international Communist objectives. The Kremlin could not impose on the CCP, as it imposed on the Satellites parties, "leaders" who in fact owed their careers mainly to Moscow and who acted as simple instruments of Moscow's will, implementing policy decisions made in the Kremlin--decisions which often conflicted sharply with national objectives. Moreover, in Eastern Europe the Kremlin's puppets were backed by strong Soviet military forces; Soviet forces in China, concentrated in the Port Arthur area, were no match even for Chinese forces in Manchuria, and Soviet use of military means to effect the Kremlin's will would have meant a war--and a war, at that, with the USSR's only real ally. In addition, the Soviet position in the Satellites rested in large part on Soviet control of the native secret police, the installation of Soviet watchdogs in all key ministries, and the use of Soviet advisors--in government, industry and the military forces--whose advice was mandatory. The picture as to Soviet personnel in China in the early days of the Peiping regime was not clear, but seemed to be different. There was no evidence of Soviet control of the Chinese secret police system, although Soviet specialists reportedly helped to improve it. There were probably top-level Soviet advisors in some key ministries, and there were certainly some with the armed forces; and there were many thousands of Soviet technicians throughout China. But the Chinese, while receptive to Soviet advice, apparently felt free to reject it.

Before the Peiping regime was a year old, the Korean war gave Communist China an opportunity to enhance its stature in the bloc. The Kremlin was unwilling to commit Soviet forces to the war in sufficient strength to prevent a Communist debacle. [redacted]

[redacted] the price for the Chinese "volunteer" effort was the immense build-up of the Chinese Communist army and air force which the Russians subsequently undertook (4). However, both the intervention and the build-up were to the interest of both parties. In any case, the Chinese achievement of a military standoff with the West in Korea--even

25X1

25X1

**SECRET**

though this was the result of the UN's self-imposed restraint, reflecting the Soviet military commitment to China--gave the USSR added reason to value the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Peiping's special status was illustrated throughout the period 1950-1953, the last years of Stalin's life, by a contrast between internal developments in the Satellites and those in China. Following the Kremlin's break with Tito, Moscow was anxious to suppress every deviationist trend before it could grow into a Titoist threat, and Soviet theorists were insisting that the Soviet forms of "transition to socialism" must be followed very closely. The Satellites responded to the hard Soviet line by purging their "nationalist" elements, "smashing" their bourgeoisie, and expropriating private industry. Although Soviet theorists at that time were consistently describing Peiping as a "people's democracy" which should presumably follow the Eastern European pattern, developments in Communist China in fact did not. The Chinese, describing themselves as adapting Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, continued to pursue their course: there were no important purges of the party, the bourgeoisie were being largely "converted", and socialization proceeded slowly.

#### Peiping's Rise to "Co-Leader," 1953-1955

Immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953, both the Chinese and the USSR took steps to enhance Peiping's prestige and to increase its actual strength. Chou En-lai, the only non-Soviet pallbearer at Stalin's funeral, took the initiative in proposing--in the same month--new terms for a Korean truce. In May 1953 the Kremlin apparently moved a considerable way toward meeting the demands of a Chinese economic delegation, which had been in Moscow for negotiations since August 1952, by agreeing to provide aid for the construction of 141 basic enterprises in China.

The Soviet emphasis on "collective leadership" after Stalin's death simplified Peiping's problems in publicly treating individual Soviet leaders. There did not appear to be any Chinese Communist interest in building up Malenkov as an individual, whereas the Russians faked a photograph to make Malenkov appear to be a friend of Mao's.

In the spring of 1954, Chou En-lai represented Peiping at the Geneva conference, and took the leading role for the

bloc in reaching an Indochina settlement. Chou's various excursions in that period to points in the Far East, as well as his role at Geneva, suggested considerable freedom of maneuver in Peiping's conduct of foreign affairs, with or without Soviet concurrence.

A top-level Soviet delegation, headed by Khrushchev and Bulganin, visited Peiping in October 1954 and made the greatest effort since Stalin's death to add to Chinese Communist prestige. The USSR agreed to an early transfer to the Chinese of Soviet shares in four Sino-Soviet joint stock companies and to the early withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Port Arthur. The USSR also agreed to extend aid to 15 additional basic construction projects in China and to provide another long-term credit. The parties reaffirmed that they would consult one another on all questions of common concern, and a top-level Soviet official (Khrushchev) for the first time pledged Soviet support to the Chinese in "liberating" Taiwan.

Soviet generosity to the Peiping regime continued into 1955. Immediately after taking over the Soviet leadership in February 1955, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team, through Molotov, publicly elevated Communist China to the status of coleader of the bloc: "the camp of socialism," said Molotov, "headed by the USSR--or more correctly said--headed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic." (The Chinese Communists have never so described themselves, and the Peiping regime has clearly remained a junior partner.) Soviet spokesmen increasingly hailed Mao Tse-tung's program in China, and his writings, as important "contributions" to Marxism-Leninism, thus endorsing Mao's claims to stature as a theorist beyond that of any living Soviet figure.

On the practical level, the USSR, while helping the Chinese to develop their own production capabilities, continued its large-scale military aid to Peiping. The largest single benefaction in this period came with the Soviet withdrawal from Port Arthur in spring 1955, when hundreds of Soviet jet bombers and jet fighters were transferred to the Chinese. Soviet technical assistance to Peiping's aircraft and ship-building industries apparently increased. (5)

#### Rapprochement with Yugoslavia, 1955

Yugoslavia, like the USSR and the Satellites, had extended recognition to the Peiping regime immediately upon

~~SECRET~~

its establishment in 1949. The Chinese Communists, despite continuing Yugoslav overtures, refused through 1954 even to acknowledge this recognition, and had no relations of any kind with Yugoslavia. Peiping's treatment of Belgrade was in pointed contrast to its cordial relations with all other Eastern European states, with each of which the Chinese had exchanged ambassadors, concluded a cultural co-operation agreement, a technical-scientific co-operation agreement, a postal and telecommunications and broadcasting agreements, and annual trade agreements which by 1955 had reached large proportions; by 1955 an estimated 20 percent of Peiping's foreign trade, representing \$900,000,000 in that year, was with the Satellites.(6).

Following the first Soviet steps toward a rapprochement with Yugoslavia in 1954, the Chinese took the initiative in establishing relations with Yugoslavia, and ambassadors were exchanged in May 1955. At that time, a Chinese Communist official was reported to have expressed Peiping's sympathy for the Yugoslav position as of 1948 and subsequently. (7) That the Chinese by 1955 were more sympathetic to part of the Yugoslav position than they had been in 1948 is almost certainly true. The establishment of relations with Peiping tended, however, to stimulate the Yugoslav hope for, or even belief in, a Titoist tendency in Communist China. There had never been, at least since 1948, any foundation for such a hope or belief; Peiping had repeatedly made clear--both in its theoretical pronouncements and in its actual conduct--that it disapproved of key features of Tito's internal program and foreign policy.

In May 1955, Khrushchev arrived in Belgrade to offer his hand to Tito. He declared that Soviet relations with other states were based on Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for sovereignty and national independence, nonaggression and nonintervention. (Khrushchev's formula combined the principles expressed in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 with the "five principles" devised by Chou En-lai and Nehru in 1954 as the model for relations between bloc and nonbloc states. The treaty and the Chou-Nehru formula have in common the principles of equality and mutual benefit, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in internal affairs. The treaty does not include the Chou-Nehru principles of peaceful coexistence and nonaggression, as Moscow and Peiping at that time did not recognize violation of these principles even as possible among members of

**SECRET**

the bloc. Both Moscow and Peiping have since been obliged to specify nonaggression as a principle to which bloc states must adhere).

Khrushchev is quoted by the press as having recognized, in his arrival speech, the existence of "new socialist roads." However, Soviet broadcasts, the Cominform Journal and Pravda, all carried this phrase as the "new, socialist path" (i.e., one path). The latter phrasing was consistent with the flat statement of the Soviet party organ, Party Life, only the month before, that "the path laid out by Marxism and Leninism and traversed by the Soviet Union...is the only true path."

The June 1955 joint declaration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, on relations between the two governments, stated their common recognition of the principles (less nonaggression) affirmed by Khrushchev in his arrival speech. The declaration spelled out the principle of noninterference as follows: "mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs for any reason--whether economic, political or ideological--inasmuch as questions of internal organization, differences of social systems and of concrete forms of development of socialism, are exclusively the affair of the people of the independent countries." This key passage was interpreted by the Yugoslavs, and by many other observers, as recognition of the Yugoslav right to pursue an internal program differing greatly from Soviet practices.

Following Khrushchev's return from Belgrade, the Soviet party central committee in July resolved that all Soviet relations with other Communist states and parties must "strictly observe" the principles of "complete equality, respect for national sovereignty and consideration of the national peculiarities of corresponding countries...." This by no means indicated that Soviet leaders had agreed to encourage, or even to tolerate, the development of Titoism in the Satellites. They had agreed, rather, that it was feasible to relinquish direct and detailed Soviet control of the Satellites in favor of strong party, military and economic bonds at the top, while reducing other Satellite grievances by more flexible and less discriminatory policies.

In any case, the rapprochement with Yugoslavia presented serious problems for Peiping as well as for Moscow, in view of Tito's insistence on forcing issues. The Chinese had been on record as early as 1948--in Liu Shao-chi's

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

discussion of Tito--as favoring "complete equality" of all nations and "freedom of federation or separation" for them. The Chinese were also committed, however, to the concept of "proletarian internationalism"--unity of the bloc around the USSR as the center. The Peiping regime was the only state in the bloc, outside the USSR, which both formulas fitted. That is, the Chinese, who had been careful to preserve their own freedom from Soviet control, were in fact treated by the USSR as an ally, although not entirely as an equal; and the Chinese had voluntarily and enthusiastically aligned themselves with the USSR on the major questions in both internal and external affairs, working out their differences with the Kremlin in discussions in which both parties compromised. It must have been apparent to the Chinese, in 1955, that Tito intended to continue to employ "equality" and "freedom" to pursue a most unorthodox domestic program and to maintain friendly relations with the West as well as with the bloc. It was probably also apparent to the Chinese, by that time, that Tito's rejection of "proletarian internationalism" was based on a recognition that this concept, as applied to Eastern Europe, had been a euphemism for Soviet control of other Communist states and parties. But the Chinese did not address themselves publicly, in 1955, to either aspect of the question--Tito's heresies (as the Chinese saw them), or Tito's legitimate grievances.

New Stimuli at the CPSU 20th Congress, February 1956

The "liberalization" effort in the Soviet Union--essentially the effort to replace fear by incentive as the main motivating force in Soviet society--was well under way at the time of the CPSU's 20th Congress in February 1956. The new Soviet emphasis on "socialist legality" and material welfare had been reflected to some extent in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, but "liberalization" was not advanced in those states and had hardly touched the other Satellites. The Soviet decision to denigrate Stalin, as another step in "liberalization," acted as a much greater stimulus to the Satellites than the Soviet leaders had foreseen or wished. The public remarks of Soviet leaders, as well as Khrushchev's secret speech (which was soon circulated to leaders of other bloc Communist parties), supported the view that Stalin's policies in intra-bloc relations would be considerably modified, and had the effect of encouraging nationalist elements in the Satellites, as well as Satellite peoples, to press for greater modifications than the Kremlin itself envisaged.

**SECRET**

Khrushchev in his secret speech sharply attacked Stalin as a personal dictator who had made grave mistakes, and the public pronouncements of the congress affirmed the CPSU's return to the alleged Leninist principle of "collective leadership." Although Soviet spokesmen at the congress did not draw the logical inference that a dictatorship by one Communist party over other Communist parties would be equally anti-Leninist and mistaken, some observers might reasonably have drawn that conclusion, and other parts of Khruschev's secret speech would have supported them in such a view.

Khrushchev went on to accuse Stalin of errors in "international relations" as well as in internal affairs, and specifically denounced Stalin's "shameful role" in the conflict with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev observed that the Yugoslav affair in 1948 had "contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades," and that, while Yugoslav leaders had also made "mistakes," these were "magnified in a monstrous manner" by Stalin. Deriding Stalin's assertion that he would shake his finger and Tito would fall, Khrushchev said that Tito had not fallen because he "had behind him a state and people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders." Khrushchev ended his discussion of Yugoslavia with the claim that the Soviet party had "found a proper solution" to the Yugoslav problem, and that this "liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of socialism...."

Khrushchev in his public speech at the congress cited Lenin as predicting much variety in the "forms of transition" to socialism. Further, Khrushchev praised the "peaceful" and "gradual" socialization of China and the similar programs in the Satellites as "creative Marxism in action." Khrushchev even referred favorably to "specific forms of economic management and organization of the state apparatus" in Yugoslavia.

Several other speakers at the congress developed this line. Shepilov praised the Chinese for an approach so "creative" that, from a doctrinaire viewpoint, it amounted almost to "trampling under foot the principles of Marxism-Leninism." Molotov, stating a view almost certainly in conflict with his personal convictions, declared that the variety of "roads taken in construction" had greatly increased

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

the "influence of socialism." Suslov predicted that the "transition to socialism" in capitalist states might exhibit even greater "originality."

The most sober and cautious statement along this line appeared in the resolution passed by the congress. This document observed merely that "there are quite a few nuances and differences" among Eastern European states with regard to the "form of people's democracy," and that these were in accordance with local conditions. Conceding that the "forms of transition" to socialism might in the future "differ increasingly," the resolution carefully restricted permissible variety to "forms of transition," a concept narrower than that of "roads to socialism." This phrasing was consistent with the earlier Soviet insistence that there is only one road, the road traveled by the USSR. The various Soviet formulations of this matter in the discussions with Tito and at the 20th congress were so ambiguous, however, as to permit almost any interpretation of the Soviet position--ranging from the possible view of Enver Hoxha that Albania should in all respects be as close to the USSR as it could get, short of incorporation as a Soviet republic, to the assumption of certain Yugoslavs that the USSR would approve (or at least not criticize) any internal arrangements they might choose to make. There thus remained a need for a fresh Soviet statement on the essentials of the one "road to socialism," the remainder being the permissible variety in "forms of transition."

The strong praise for Chinese Communist "creativity" at the congress was, in the context, confined to Chinese innovations in the "forms of transition." These particular innovations are in fact far less "creative" and significant than Mao's bold strategy, on his road to power, of staking the Chinese Communist movement on peasant armies operating from a rural base. Once power had been achieved, Mao followed the Soviet model in "building socialism." The Chinese, like the Russians, have seen only one "road to socialism" for an established Communist regime, and the term "Chinese innovations" means simply the Chinese use of more moderate and flexible methods than those employed by Stalin.

The official Chinese program of a "peaceful" and "step-by-step" transformation of the economy has in fact been neither so peaceful nor so gradual as Peiping (and Moscow) claim. Considerable force was applied in the early years

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

of China's socialization. Millions of Chinese were killed, and many millions more economically ruined, in the agrarian and other campaigns of 1950-1952. The Chinese program to some degree qualifies, however, as a "major contribution" to the practice of Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese casualty figures, high as they are, fall well short of the proportion of casualties in the Soviet collectivization programs of the 1920's and 1930's. In the final and critical phase of Peiping's drive for agricultural socialization and for transformation of most private industry and commerce--the phase personally initiated by Mao Tse-tung in summer 1955--major violence has apparently not been necessary. This effective adaptation of the Soviet program made the Chinese the ideal party to receive Soviet praise at the 20th congress for "creativity."

The differences in the development of Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism have been expressed in other ways than those noted above. For example, the CCP under Mao has been far more stable than the CPSU as Mao has been in the Leninist rather than Stalinist tradition in relying on persuasion much more than on purges in party affairs; only two party leaders have been purged since 1938, both apparently for trying to gain control of instruments of political power, rather than for policy differences. Similarly, the secret police have never appeared to have the power in the Chinese Communist movement that they enjoyed under Stalin and Beria in the USSR, and the party itself has not been at the mercy of the police. Another variation appears in the much greater authority given the political officer in the Chinese armed forces than in the Soviet in recent years, a system reflecting the CCP leadership's determination to prevent the armed forces (like the police) from becoming an independent power base. Another Chinese peculiarity is the CCP's effort to promote birth control in China--where the basic problem has long been that of too many people for too little land--despite the Marxist view of Malthus as a bourgeois theorist and despite the Soviet encouragement of a high birthrate. As regards the first two of these four particular differences (there are many others), the USSR has been moving in recent years back to Leninist practice (which is Chinese practice) in party and police affairs. As regards the third example, the Soviets reportedly have tried to induce Peiping to alter its political-officer system, but the Chinese are said to have refused.(8). The fourth example reflects Mao's talent for facing the facts: the USSR can make use of more people, but the

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Chinese cannot. In any case, the point here is that these and other divergences between Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism are not central to the concept of the "road to socialism," as defined by both the Russians and the Chinese.

Chinese Response to De-Stalinization, April 1956

The Chinese Communists were apparently caught off guard by Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th congress. This is suggested both by Chinese delegate Chu Te's praise of Stalin at that congress, and by delay in Peiping's response to the de-Stalinization campaign undertaken in earnest by the Soviet leadership after the congress. The Chinese were almost certainly annoyed, and possibly angered, by the Soviet handling of the affair.

Peiping's official response came in April 1956 in the form of a long article, "On Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," said to be "based on discussions of an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau" of the CCP--that is, discussion by perhaps the top 30 or 40 CCP leaders.

The Chinese Communist statement endorsed the Soviet campaign against the "cult of the individual" and for "collective leadership," but with important reservations. These related to the contributions of Stalin and the prospect for further errors.

The statement described Stalin--as both the Russians and Chinese describe Mao--as one who "creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism." Conceding that Stalin had committed "several gross errors," and asserting that the Chinese themselves had corrected similar errors long ago, the statement described Stalin nevertheless as an "outstanding champion of Marxism-Leninism." The statement specified that Stalin's "indelible achievements" included his defense of "Lenin's line on industrialization and agricultural collectivization," and observed that Stalin's works "will still be studied seriously...especially much of his writing in defense of Leninism and in correctly summarizing Soviet experience in construction...."

The Chinese statement appeared to criticize, or at least to diverge from, the Kremlin's treatment of Stalin on both factual and tactical grounds. The Chinese appeared to feel that Stalin's actual contributions were

**SECRET**

being under-rated, and that orthodox Marxism-Leninism was being undermined in the attack on Stalin. That the Chinese foresaw the threat to the unity of the bloc is conjectural, but they were clearly correct in being concerned over the vulnerability of the de-Stalinization campaign to the charge that the main fault lay in the system rather than in the individual. The main lines of Stalin's program were, after all, the main lines of the program of all bloc states, not merely in Stalin's time but at the time Khrushchev's attack was made, apart from Yugoslavia.

The Chinese statement strongly defended the over-all Soviet record since 1917, arguing that Marxist-Leninists had never pretended to be immune from error. The statement logically developed this thought, thus declining to accept the implication in the 20th congress pronouncements that the Khrushchev-Bulganin team, in combating the "cult of the individual," had thereby ensured itself against making mistakes of its own.

It is also inconceivable that certain mistakes made earlier preclude the possibility of certain other mistakes later or even of repetition of past mistakes to a greater or lesser extent....If some Communists indulge in self-exaltation and complacency and develop a rigidity of outlook, then they may repeat their own or others' mistakes....

The Chinese statement specified that Stalin's "important mistakes" included those of excessive action against "counter-revolutionaries," insufficient attention to the development of agriculture and the material welfare of the peasantry, and "certain erroneous lines on the international Communist movement, especially on the question of Yugoslavia." Although Khrushchev had made these same points in his secret speech, it is important to note the Chinese citation of them in the context of the Chinese insistence that past mistakes might be repeated. Some observers, correctly noting that the Chinese regard Stalin's achievements as great and that the Chinese are in many respects "Stalinists," have gone on to conclude that Peiping approves Stalinist policies in intrabloc relations. The Chinese, however, in this April statement explicitly criticized the scale of Stalin's use of terror, the degree of his exploitation of the people, and his effort to impose direct Soviet control on another party and

state. These were and are major questions in intrabloc relations.

The Chinese statement at another point aimed its moral at each member of the bloc:

Whether it is the Soviet Union, China, or any other People's Democracy, each has its own experience in success and experience in errors. We should continuously sum up such experiences. We must be vigilant to the possibility that we will still commit errors in the future. The important lesson is that (we) confine errors to particular, local, temporary errors, and not let...(these) grow into nationwide errors or errors of long duration.

Confusion and Evasion, June 1956

Early in June 1956, Tito returned Khrushchev's visit of May 1955, and his trip to Moscow ended with a joint declaration on the re-establishment of party relations between the CPSU and the Yugoslav League of Communists. The June 1956 declaration represented the Soviet Party's farthest retreat from Stalinist principles in party relations. The declaration affirmed the belief of the two parties that "the paths of social development vary in different countries and conditions, that the wealth of forms of development of socialism contributes to its strength," and further affirmed that "each side holds alien any tendency to impose its views with regard to the paths and forms of socialist development...." Thus, the declaration stated, the two parties agreed that their future "co-operation" would be based on "complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views...." It is almost certain that the USSR did not wish to make so great a concession on either the "paths of social development" or the principles of party relations, but was forced to do so in order to get a joint declaration. The Chinese Communist press endorsed the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration, following the Soviet practice of minimizing the continuing differences between Tito and the bloc.

On 4 June the US Department of State published the text--the authenticity of which was never denied--of Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th congress in February.

In June several Communist parties outside the bloc criticized Soviet handling of the speech and pressed the USSR for clarification of questions raised by the speech. All this suggested that there was, if not yet clearly a crisis, at least a severe disturbance, in the international Communist movement.

The issues raised by the speech, for the world Communist movement, were stated most sharply by Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian Communist party. Togliatti criticized the Soviet Party for evading the question of "degeneration" of the Soviet system, described the world Communist camp as "polycentric," advocated the "full autonomy" of Communist parties, and cited the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement as a "model." The key parts of Togliatti's interview with the press, and his report to a plenary session of the ICP's central committee, were:

The true problems are evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could reach and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way..., even to the point of degeneration....

The experience accomplished in the building of a socialist society in the Soviet Union cannot contain instructions for resolving all the questions which may present themselves today to us and to the Communists of other countries.... Thus various points or centers of development and orientation are established. There is established...a polycentric system, corresponding to the new situation..., and to this system correspond also new types of relations among the Communist parties themselves. The solution which today probably most nearly corresponds to this new situation may be that of full autonomy of the individual Communist parties and of bilateral relations between them.

We especially hail the agreement recently reached between the CPSU and the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists.... (The agreement) could constitute a model for the new relations which are being set up among the different sectors of the Communist movement....

Togliatti's remarks were partly in conflict, and partly in agreement, with the position stated or implied in the Chinese Communist statement of April 1956. The Chinese had been at pains to defend the Soviet system as a system, had not recognized multiple paths to socialism, and had cited the USSR as still the one center of the Communist camp. The Chinese had, however, been critical of Stalinist policies in intrabloc relations, and had implied their favor for the autonomy of Communist parties.

The CPSU central committee on 30 June published a resolution, "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and its Consequences," in response to the questions raised by Communists abroad. Taking note that "certain of our friends abroad are not completely clear" on the de-Stalinization campaign, the long resolution did little to clarify the situation, evading the main points which had been raised by other parties.

Much of the Chinese Communist pronouncement of April had been devoted to an exposition of the CCP view that any Communist party might make mistakes in the future or even repeat past mistakes. The CPSU's 30 June resolution argued that the de-Stalinization campaign "creates firm guarantees that such phenomena as the personality cult will never again develop in our country...." Only at one point, and then indirectly, did the 30 June resolution admit Soviet fallibility: guided by Leninism, the CPSU stated, "our party will continue to boldly disclose, openly criticize, and resolutely remove mistakes and omissions in its work."

Picking up a line which had appeared in the comment of certain other Communist parties, the 30 June resolution argued that Soviet successes were so closely identified with Stalin personally that "any action against him under these conditions would not have been understood by the people." The resolution took note of Togliatti's query as to whether the Soviet system in some respects had reached "degeneration," but asserted that "There is no foundation for posing such a question." The resolution stated that it would be a "serious mistake" to expect "some kind of changes in the social system to the USSR...."

The 30 June resolution did not even mention Togliatti's other key point, his call for "fully autonomous" Communist

parties. The resolution evaded the issue in the following terms:

Under the new historical conditions such international working class organizations as the Comintern and Cominform have ceased their activities. It does not follow from this, however, that international solidarity and the need for contacts among revolutionary fraternal parties adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism have lost their significance. At present..., when the difference in paths (sic) to socialism in various countries is becoming apparent, the Marxist parties of the working class, naturally, must retain and strengthen their ideological unity and international fraternal solidarity...."

Soviet Anxiety, Summer 1956

After the Poznan riots of late June 1956, the Khrushchev leadership apparently began to move toward Molotov's earlier advocacy of a harder line on both of the main aspects of the "road to socialism," i.e., the applicability of the Soviet model, and the nature of relationships among bloc members. At the same time the riots signalled the beginning of a divergent Chinese line on Eastern European affairs, a line which in the next several months contained a degree of criticism of Soviet policies unprecedented for Peiping.

The Poznan riots were spontaneous demonstrations initiated by Polish workers who felt that the government had reneged on a promise of wage increases; the riots did not at first involve the question of Polish ties with the USSR. The Chinese did not give their complete support to the Soviet line on the riots. Moscow and all the Satellites except Poland and Hungary insisted that the riots were organized by Western agents, whereas Warsaw and Budapest rightly saw the main cause as the workers' legitimate grievances. Peiping took a middle position, arguing that Western agents could not have succeeded if there had been no grievances to exploit.

The Chinese divergence on Poznan has since been the ground for two extremes of speculation, both of which

assume that the Chinese foresaw the magnitude of the Kremlin's problems in Eastern Europe. At one extreme, it has been argued that Peiping began craftily in June 1956 to play a spurious role as a friend of Poland, in order later to intervene more effectively on Moscow's behalf. At the other extreme, it is argued that the Chinese during spring 1956 perceived in Soviet blundering a splendid opportunity to enhance their own role in the bloc at Moscow's expense. The truth seems to be somewhere between these extremes. That is, Chinese behavior since Poznan suggests that Peiping was genuinely concerned with Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe but was not anxious to intervene, and that the Chinese were gradually drawn in as the situation deterioriated.

It is not known whether Moscow even noticed the Chinese divergence on Poznan. The emergency in Poland was quickly followed in Hungary by the ouster of the Stalinist puppet, Matyas Rakosi, as party leader. Inasmuch as the Soviet-imposed successor to Rakosi, Erno Gero, offered a more conciliatory program than Rakosi's, it appeared that the dominant group among the Soviet leadership still wished to modify Stalinist policies toward and in Eastern Europe, but well short of "national Communism." There was in fact a new emphasis in Soviet pronouncements on the concept of "proletarian internationalism," i.e., unity of the bloc around the USSR. Khrushchev in July, and Pravda twice the same month, argued as follows:

Much has been said about the question of different ways of advance toward socialism.... Some people interpret this question in such a way as to disunite countries of the socialist camp, to split our forces.... We must strengthen fraternal solidarity between Communist and workers' parties that stand on the position of Marxism-Leninism." (Khrushchev)

"...It should also be remembered that among people who are not politically mature and who are extremely gullible there may be some who will rise to the bait of bombastic words about 'national communism'.... Creatively applying Marxism-Leninism, free people... are moving toward one goal, toward Communism. It is impossible to move separately or haphazardly toward such a great goal...." (Pravda)

DRAFT

The diversity of paths to socialism...does not in the least mean that the great idea of proletarian internationalism has become "obsolete." Different paths to socialism are by no means paths which diverge;...all these paths lead to a single goal. Loyalty to the great banner of proletarian internationalism and the growing cohesion of fighters for socialism are of paramount importance...." (Pravda)

At the Chinese Communist 8th Party's Congress in September 1956, Anastas Mikoyan, believed to be a Khrushchev follower as regards Eastern European policies, tried to make clear that the Kremlin's conciliatory actions were not intended to justify any Communist state in taking a Titoist course. Conceding that each country has its "distinctive features" in making the "transition to socialism," Mikoyan quoted Lenin as emphasizing that "these features can relate only to what is not most important." Mikoyan warmly praised the Chinese for "major contributions"--the relatively flexible Chinese approach to social classes and to socialization of the economy--which, as he correctly implied, were not so major as to challenge Soviet doctrine in its most important aspects. As for party relations, Mikoyan observed mildly that the "forms and ties between Marxist parties are not predetermined and not immutable...." He envisaged an "exchange of experience" among bloc states in order "to use most efficiently the experience of all countries...."

Also at the CCP's 8th congress, buried in the long address by Mao Tse-tung's top lieutenant, Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese party leadership offered the first version of its two-sided formula--later expanded and much publicized--for intrabloc relations. The CCP, Liu said, hopes and works for the "great international solidarity of the proletariat," and "must continue to strengthen our fraternal solidarity" with all other Communist parties. As for the two sides of the formula: "In our relations with all fraternal parties, we must show warmth and take a modest attitude toward them. We must resolutely oppose any dangerous inclination toward great-nation chauvinism or bourgeois nationalism."

In the same month, the Satellite parties are reliably reported to have received a letter from the CPSU warning them against Yugoslavia's example in either

**SECRET**

domestic or foreign affairs(9). Later in September, Khrushchev and Tito held talks in which they apparently failed in efforts to reach agreements on bloc relationships.

At about the same time, Soviet theorists were reaffirming the "laws" of all socialist states--that is, those features of Soviet practice regarded as obligatory for all states calling themselves "socialist." These "laws," partially stated by Kommunist in October and Suslov in November, and since officialized in a Soviet party central committee resolution of March 1957, are: (a) the establishment of a Communist dictatorship, in the name primarily of the working class; (b) the abolition of capitalist ownership and establishment of public ownership of the "basic means of production"; (c) the planned development and socialization of the economy (including collectivization of agriculture); (d) the defense of these "gains" against internal and external enemies; and (e) solidarity with the world Communist movement, i.e., "proletarian internationalism." Soviet theorists were then asserting, and still are, that the Chinese Communist use of the bourgeoisie and Peiping's "peaceful methods" of transformation are entirely consistent with these "laws." It was apparent, despite the failure of the theorists to discuss Yugoslavia in summer 1956, that Yugoslavia had disqualified itself as a "socialist" state on several counts: the government was a Soviet-style dictatorship, but the trend was toward decentralization, agricultural collectivization had been abandoned, and, of most importance, Belgrade had rejected the concept of bloc unity against the West.

#### Chinese Support of Gomulka, September-October 1956

Poland's Ochab and Hungary's Kadar were delegates to the CCP's 8th congress. There are several reports that Chinese Communist leaders, in private conversations with Ochab, expressed sympathy for Polish aspirations to independence of the USSR.(10). The precise content of these conversations, or of similar conversations which may have been held with Kadar, is not known. It is reasonable to believe that the Chinese would indeed have expressed sympathy for Polish aspirations to the position which the Chinese had won for themselves--freedom from Soviet control and exploitation, and freedom

to adapt the Soviet model to local conditions, while maintaining a firm alliance with the Soviet Union and following the Soviet lead on major questions in international affairs.

Chinese Communist favor for Gomulka was expressed immediately, during the Polish party plenum in October. Chinese broadcasts at that time noted Polish "concern" over the visit of the Khrushchev delegation during the plenary session (with the clear implication that Khrushchev was trying to intervene in an internal Polish party matter), and noted also Polish demands for the defense of "national sovereignty." Reflecting the other side of the Chinese position, the broadcasts also reported favorably Gomulka's apparent intention to maintain the "Polish-Soviet alliance." Peiping's coverage presented essentially the same picture as in the Polish press--that is, spontaneous popular support of Gomulka for a program aimed at correcting earlier mistakes and presenting no danger to the USSR or other members of the bloc. Among Eastern European states, only Yugoslavia showed as much enthusiasm for the Polish party plenum as did Peiping; the Satellite press followed the Soviet lead in giving only minimum coverage.

It is likely that the Chinese Communist leadership was somewhat less enthusiastic about Gomulka, however, than the Chinese press suggested or Polish officials believed. Gomulka's speeches of late October, which were published in Peiping and presumably read carefully there, suggested an intention to go beyond the Chinese degree of independence in both domestic and foreign affairs, to a point somewhere between Communist China and Yugoslavia. Moreover, events were moving rapidly, in the same direction, in Hungary. The Western press reported that Mao Tse-tung sent a telegram of "congratulations" to Gomulka after the latter's election as first secretary of the Polish party, implying that Mao had congratulated Gomulka for his defiance of the Kremlin. Mao may well have congratulated Gomulka on his election, but any message appended to Mao's congratulations would probably have contained an indirect admonition that Chinese support would depend on Gomulka's good behavior. In fact no telegram from Mao to Gomulka has been published; if Gomulka had indeed received an unequivocal statement of support from Mao, he would probably have published it in order to strengthen his position against Moscow and with the Poles themselves.

### Soviet Declaration of 30 October

On 30 October, at the high tide of the Hungarian revolution, the Soviet Union issued a declaration on intrabloc relations. The declaration affirmed Soviet fidelity to Leninist principles (those of the Sino-Soviet treaty, plus "national independence," essentially the set affirmed in the Soviet-Yugoslav state agreement of June 1955), admitted past errors which "demeaned the principle of equality" in intrabloc relations, and promised to take appropriate action on economic and military questions at issue with Eastern European states. The declaration appeared to represent a Soviet belief that abandonment of the "liberalization" line in Eastern Europe would undermine the anti-Stalinist line in Soviet domestic and foreign affairs, and a Soviet hope for a temporary "Gomulka solution" in Hungary. The key passages in the declaration were as follows:

...the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their mutual relations only on principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs....

In the process of the rise of the new system... there have been many difficulties, unresolved problems, and downright mistakes, including mistakes in the mutual relations among the socialist countries--violations and errors which demeaned the principle of equality in relations among the socialist states....

The Soviet government is prepared to discuss... measures ensuring further development and strengthening of economic ties among socialist countries in order to remove any possibility of violation of the principles of national sovereignty, mutual benefit, and equality in economic relations... (and) to review...the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries (Poland, Hungary, Rumania)....

The Peiping regime on 1 November issued a declaration endorsing the Soviet declaration of 30 October, but going beyond the Soviet self-criticism in criticizing

past Soviet policies. The Peiping statement, citing the Chou-Nehru "five principles" for relations between bloc and nonbloc states, observed that intrabloc relations should "all the more so" be based on these principles. (This is almost exactly the line which Hsiao Chun had been rebuked for taking, with the USSR, in 1948.) The statement further noted that past "mistakes" had prevented some bloc states from building socialism "better in accordance with their historical circumstances and special features," and that sometimes a "tense situation" had occurred; aiming their criticism primarily at the USSR, the Chinese specified "the handling of the 1948-49 Yugoslav situation and the recent happenings in Poland and Hungary" as illustrations.

The Chinese declaration of 1 November went beyond the Soviet declaration in describing as "completely proper" Polish and Hungarian demands for greater "democracy, independence and equality" and for greater material well-being; the declaration observed (as had the Polish press) that satisfaction of such demands would be both "helpful" in maintaining Communist system in those countries and "favorable" to bloc unity. Peiping's statement developed Liu Shao-chi's concept (from the Eighth congress in September) of "great-nation chauvinism;" the 1 November declaration cited the "error of bourgeois chauvinism...particularly the error of chauvinism by a big country," as a source of "serious damage" to bloc solidarity. Peiping also reminded its readers of the other side of the Chinese position, warning against "reactionary elements who attempt to undermine the people's democratic system and unity among socialist countries." This latter statement lined up Peiping with Moscow in indirectly warning Eastern European leaders not to press beyond the limits indicated in the Soviet declaration of 30 October--that is, not to permit their regimes to become non-Communist states or to leave the bloc.

#### Solidarity on Hungary, November 1956

Within a day or two the Hungarian situation was getting out of control, and the USSR was preparing to crush the Nagy regime for having declared in favor of a multiparty system in Hungary, neutrality, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 2 November Peiping began to emphasize a theme which thereafter was prominent in all its comment on Eastern Europe--that the "highest

duty" of Communist states is to maintain their "unity," regardless of past mistakes. Arguing that a "new cause cannot be immune from errors," the People's Daily pleaded for recognition that all such errors "can be corrected and eliminated." Addressing themselves directly to Hungary, the Chinese said that they were "profoundly sympathetic" with the Hungarians in their "misfortune," but that the Hungarians must realize they could attain their objectives "only as a socialist country."

Peiping's immediate endorsement, on 4 November, of the massive Soviet armed intervention in Hungary, was consistent with its previous advocacy of greater freedom for Communist states within the bloc. The 4 November statement made a sharp distinction between the Gomulka government, which "has insisted on its socialist system... (and) has continued its support of the Warsaw treaty and its policy of friendship with the Soviet Union," and the Nagy government which had become anti-Communist and had announced its intention to leave the bloc. Peiping clearly agreed with Moscow that a failure to act in Hungary would have led to the loss not only of Hungary but, sooner or later, of the other Eastern European states as well.

Peiping's own accounts of the "errors" of both the Soviets and the Stalinist former party leaders in Hungary, however, had put the Chinese Communists in an unhappy position in trying to justify Soviet actions to anyone except the international-minded party elite. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] in a large public meeting, criticism of the Anglo-French action in Egypt received ready applause, while approving references to the Soviet action in Hungary were received in complete silence.(11). Similarly, the People's Daily on 13 November recalled "considerable confusion" in socialist ranks in 1939 and 1946--almost certainly an allusion to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviet stripping of Manchuria; the editorial cited the Hungarian events as the latest "test" of whether Communists everywhere could be true to "proletarian internationalism" in "complex and difficult situations." The same defensiveness was evident in Peiping's comment on the Soviet-Polish talks a few days later; the Chinese invited the Hungarian people to accept the talks as evidence that Soviet policy toward Eastern European states "is truly one of equality, friendship and mutual assistance," and

SECRET

not, as the Hungarians might somehow have concluded, one of "conquest, aggression and plunder."

Reaffirmation of Peiping's Position, November 1956

Even in this period of solid support for Soviet policy in Hungary, Peiping did not withdraw its advocacy of greater freedom for Communist states within the bloc. Polish Communist Party sources in mid-November reported that Peiping had assured the Gomulka government of continued support for the Polish position on relationships with the Soviet Union. The Chinese assurances, delivered after Feiping's endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, were said to make the same clear distinction between Polish and Hungarian developments as did the 4 November People's Daily (12).

Peiping publicly reaffirmed its position on intra-bloc relations in discussing the Soviet-Polish communiqué of 18 November. In this communiqué, the USSR took a long step toward meeting Poland's political, economic and military demands. The communiqué affirmed Soviet fidelity to the principles set forth in the Soviet declaration of 30 October (complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs), provided for a long-term Soviet credit (equal to half of those granted Poland by the USSR between 1946 and 1955), provided for settlement of other economic questions, and gave Poland some measure of control over Soviet troops in Poland. Peiping hailed the communiqué as a "vivid example...of proper relations between Socialist countries." Pointing with satisfaction to the economic and military concessions, Peiping, unlike Moscow, specified that the Soviet cancellation of part of Poland's debt was to "make up for the insufficient payment received by Poland in the sale of Polish coal to the Soviet Union...."

More important than Peiping's endorsement of the Soviet-Polish communiqué--which was, of course, hailed by the Soviet press as well--was Peiping's reaffirmation of the Chinese view that Leninist principles might again be violated, that not all mistakes had been corrected, and that "great-nation chauvinism" was the principal problem. The relevant passages, from the People's Daily editorial of 21 November, are:

...proper relations between Socialist countries... have to conform to the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial inviolability, respect for national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's domestic affairs....But the establishment of these principles does not, in itself, preclude the possibility of mistakes violating them. There were mistakes in the past, there are now, and mistakes will also not be entirely avoided in the future....

The question, therefore, is how to deal with such errors, whether they can be corrected firmly and in time....The Soviet-Polish talks prove that errors between Socialist countries can and must be rectified....In future relations between Socialist countries, if only the larger nations pay more attention to avoiding the mistake of great-nation chauvinism (this is the main thing), and the smaller nations avoid the mistake of nationalism (this is also essential), friendship and solidarity based on equality will undoubtedly become consolidated and will advance....

In the same editorial, Peiping predicted that "Whatever was wrong in the relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary will be resolutely put right by the Soviet Union..., as it has done in the case of the Polish comrades...."

#### Renewal of Yugoslav-Soviet Dispute, November-December, 1956

Many Soviet and Satellite leaders apparently concluded that the rapprochement with Yugoslavia had been a major factor in the bloc's troubles in Poland and Hungary. Yugoslav suspicions that Belgrade was being blamed by other bloc parties were confirmed on 8 November, when Pravda published an article by Albania's Hoxha which pointed an accusing finger at (without mentioning) Yugoslavia.

Apparently feeling pushed, Tito chose in a speech at Pula on 11 November to attack directly the question of Stalinism, rather than glossing over these issues as had the Soviet-Yugoslav agreements of June 1955 and June 1956. Tito charged the Soviet leadership with failing to modify appreciably the Stalinist internal system, and with persisting in a Stalinist course in intrabloc relations.

Tito said that, while the Soviet leaders at the CPSU's 20th congress rightly condemned Stalin's actions and policies, "they wrongly considered the whole thing as a question of the cult of personality and not as a question of the system." Tito asserted that it was "necessary to strike at the roots" of the system--namely "bureaucratic apparatus and one-man rule" and disregard of popular demands--a system which continued to be advocated by leaders of many Communist parties. Tito clearly intended this picture to be compared unfavorably with the Yugoslav trend toward decentralization, involving worker-management (in theory) of the factories and abandonment of agricultural collectivization.

Tito went on to argue that the principles of the two Soviet-Yugoslav declarations (of 1955 and 1956) should be applied "in relations between all socialist countries, but unfortunately they have not been understood in this way." Tito said that the Soviet leadership had made concessions to Yugoslavia only because the Yugoslav Communists had maintained their organizational integrity and had earned respect, and that the USSR had no intention of implementing those principles in dealing with Eastern European states where the Kremlin had brought Communist leaders to power. (Khrushchev had in fact spoken of Yugoslavia in these terms in his secret speech of February 1956, and Tito was certainly right in thinking that the Soviet leaders would interpret their professed principles differently than he.)

Tito asserted that he had warned Soviet leaders that the nationalist tendencies which led to resistance in Yugoslavia existed in other countries as well, but that the Soviet leaders had had "certain wrong and defective views" on relations with these other countries, including Poland and Hungary. Tito speculated that there were opposing groups in the Soviet leadership: on one hand, the intransigent Stalinists; on the other hand, those who favored rapid "democratization, abandonment of all Stalinist methods, the creation of new relations among socialist states, and development in this same direction in foreign policy as well." Tito stated his belief that the Hungarian developments would persuade the advocates of Stalinist policies in Eastern Europe that "it is no longer possible to work in this way."

The Kremlin replied to Tito's criticisms in a Pravda article of 23 November. Apparently trying to prevent the

renewed dispute from growing into a complete split, Moscow adopted a conciliatory tone, and mildly rebuked Tito for having made his observations "in a tone which lately had become almost extinct."

As for the Soviet state system, Pravda returned in effect to the 30 June argument in asserting that the "cult of personality was a crying contradiction to the whole of our Soviet Socialist system," which had not been originated by Stalin and which had proved its strength in building up the USSR and surviving a world war. The USSR, said Pravda, was trying to correct its (past Stalinist) "shortcomings" by raising living standards, strictly observing legal processes, and advancing "socialist democracy." (There was still no admission, however, that the current leadership had "shortcomings" of its own, or that it also could be expected to make mistakes, as the Chinese had argued.) Pravda criticized the Yugoslav "road to socialism", mentioning particularly Belgrade's reliance on "imperialist" aid, its decentralization of economic planning, and its failure to collectivize agriculture.

As for intrabloc relations, the 23 November editorial reaffirmed Soviet fidelity to the principles of the 30 October declaration, asserting that "errors of the past in this field are being resolutely corrected." Pravda specified, as examples of Soviet sincerity, the joint declarations with Tito and the Soviet-Polish communique of 18 November (concluded since Tito's speech), the latter being offered in answer to Tito's contention that only Yugoslavia was benefitting; Pravda also claimed that the Hungarian troubles had been caused by slavish imitation of Soviet methods, against the advice of Soviet leaders themselves. As for a split in the Kremlin on this issue, Pravda denied that there were "'Stalinists' in the CPSU allegedly seeking to subordinate the fraternal parties...." Apparently replying to Tito's expressed hope of a new non-Stalinist course in foreign policy in general, the editorial stated that socialist countries could gain no advantage from Tito's course of "going on his own," and that "unity of all fighters for socialism" (against the West) was vital to the success of the Communist cause.

The Tito-Pravda exchange put the Chinese Communists in an awkward position. The CCP was praised in the Pravda editorial for supporting the Soviet line on Hungary, and also for having made a "huge contribution" to the theory

and practice of "socialist construction" without having tried to impose their "methods" on others. Pravda was perfectly safe in praising the CCP on these grounds; the Chinese had consistently agreed with Moscow on the need to follow the Soviet model in internal affairs and to maintain the bloc's unity against the West. Pravda chose to conceal, however, the degree to which the Chinese agreed with Tito on questions of intrabloc relations; while Tito's charges were much stronger, and much less tactfully phrased, than the Chinese, Peiping's criticism of Stalinist policies in intrabloc relations had in some respects been similar to Tito's.

The Chinese stayed away from the renewed Yugoslav-Soviet controversy throughout November. On 7 December, Yugoslav theorist Kardelj made a definitive statement of Yugoslav differences with Moscow on almost all current issues, including Stalinism, developments in Hungary, relations between Communist states, and Yugoslav concepts of methods of socialist development. On 12 December, Peiping published the full text of Tito's Pula speech; only Poland and Hungary had previously done so. The next day, Chinese newspapers carried Pravda's rebuttal of 23 November, and later printed Kardelj's speech.

#### Peiping's Definitive Position, 29 December 1956

The Peiping regime on 29 December 1956 published a 14,000-word article, "More on the Historical Experience of the Proletariat," which constitutes by far the most elaborate statement on the "road to socialism" to have come from any Communist capital. This article, a companion piece to Peiping's April 1956 pronouncement on de-Stalinization, was also based on a discussion by the CCP leadership.

As noted by several observers, the article is remarkable for the assurance with which Peiping surveys the entire bloc scene, pulls together the pieces, and offers a formula for the solution of outstanding problems in intrabloc relations. While there is little in the article which had not appeared either in Chinese or in Soviet comment, or in both, the publication of this article marked the most emphatic of all self-assertions of the Chinese Communist leadership as a source of guidance for all members of the bloc, including the USSR. This article is a definitive statement of Peiping's over-all position.

Peiping's statement proceeds from what it terms the "most fundamental fact" of the world scene--the "antagonism" or "contradictions" between the camps of "imperialism" and "socialism." There are also "contradictions" (not antagonisms) between members of a Communist party, between Communist governments and the people they rule, and between Communist states and parties--but these are "not basic," and must "be subordinated to the over-all interests of the struggle against the enemy"; those who cannot see this are "definitely not Communists or Marxist-Leninists." Peiping was thus restating the Sino-Soviet theme of the imperative need for Communist unity against the West, and denying to the Yugoslavs the name of "Communists."

Reiterating the Chinese line of April 1956, and endorsing the contention of Pravda in the 23 November reply to Tito, Peiping's statement defends the Soviet course of development as generally sound. The "fundamental experience" of the USSR, said Peiping--that is, the features of the Soviet state which must be adopted by all Communist states--are these: (a) the organization of a Leninist Communist party; (b) the assumption of political power by this party through "revolutionary struggle"; (c) the establishment of a Communist dictatorship, in the name of the proletariat and classes regarded as friendly at a given time, which will "crush" opposition and carry out nationalization of industry and step-by-step collectivization of agriculture; (d) the planned development of the economy; and (e) adherence to the principles (i.e., adherence to the bloc under the principles) of "proletarian internationalism." The statement observes that it is just these features of the Communist world which the "imperialists" wish to see changed. In this part of the statement--in essential agreement with Soviet formulations, including those of Kommunist in October and Suslov in November--Peiping was once again defending orthodox Marxism-Leninism, reaffirming its view that there is only this one "road to socialism," warning Eastern European leaders (particularly the Poles) that "liberalization" must not go beyond these limits, and again denying to the Yugoslavs the name of Communists.

Peiping's statement then addresses itself to the question of Stalin's "mistakes." Arguing that Stalin made a "great contribution," the statement repeats the April article's praise of Stalin for pressing forward in industrialization and collectivization. It also repeats, and expands on, Peiping's earlier description of

Stalin's "serious mistakes"---"most conspicuously," in internal affairs, the scale of his use of terror against the populace and of purges in the party; and, in intra-bloc relations, his "tendency to great-nation chauvinism," which led to his "intervening mistakenly, with many grave consequences, in the internal affairs of certain brother countries and parties." Arguing, as had Khrushchev in February, that Stalin's errors derived from his arrogance and obstinacy, Peiping's statement reiterates the later Sino-Soviet defense that these errors "did not originate in the Socialist system" and that they are to be corrected, not by changing the system, but by restoring the Leninist principles perverted by Stalin. In two key passages, the statement returns to Peiping's argument of April that any Communist party may make mistakes and that certain Stalinist mistakes have not yet been corrected.

No system, however excellent, can guard against serious mistakes in our work. Once we have the right system, the main question is whether we can make the right use of it.... What is more, with conditions changing, new problems arise as old ones are solved, and there is no solution which holds good for all time.... In the socialist countries, the task of the Communist party and state is...to discover and correct mistakes in their work in good time....

It is obvious that, since Stalin's mistakes were not of short duration, their thorough correcting cannot be achieved overnight....Eager to take advantage of the opportunity to erase what was correct in Stalin's work..., the Western bourgeoisie...have deliberately labeled the correction of Stalin's mistakes "de-Stalinization" and have described it as a struggle waged by "anti-Stalinist elements" against "Stalinist elements".... Unfortunately, similar views of this kind have also gained ground among some Communists.... Only by adopting an objective and analytical attitude can we correctly appraise Stalin and all those comrades who made similar mistakes under his influence, and correctly deal with their mistakes....

The statement at this point addresses itself directly to Tito. Having just conceded obliquely the possibility

SECRET

that Tito was right in regarding exponents of Stalinist errors as still active ("those comrades who made similar mistakes under his influence"), Peiping rebukes Tito for putting the issue explicitly in those terms:

The attitude taken by Comrade Tito...cannot be regarded by us as well-balanced or objective. It is understandable that the Yugoslav comrades bear a particular resentment against Stalin's mistakes... (but) We feel it necessary to say...that he (Tito) adopted a wrong attitude when he set up so-called "Stalinist elements," etc., as objects of attack and maintained that the question now is whether the course "begun in Yugoslavia" or the so-called "Stalinist course" would win out. This can only lead to a split in the Communist movement....

The Chinese had good reason, in their view, for wishing the issues not be put in Yugoslav terms. First, "Stalinism" could not properly be used as a term of opprobrium, inasmuch as the main features of the Soviet state under Stalin continued to be put forward by Moscow and Peiping as the model for all Communist states. Second, an emphasis on the strength of current exponents of Stalin's mistakes could serve again, as it had in Yugoslavia in 1948, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, to justify movements toward "national Communism."

Peiping's statement then addresses itself to the question of "doctrinaireism" versus "revisionism." The statement observes that, while "one of the grave consequences of Stalin's mistakes was the growth of doctrinaireism," some Communists had "helped to foster a revisionist trend against Marxism-Leninism," a trend useful to the "imperialists." The statement sums up the Marxist-Leninist position as holding that all nations "arrive at Communism by roads that are the same in essence but different in their specific forms." The doctrinaires, said Peiping, do not realize that Marxism-Leninism must be applied to specific situations, and their "indiscriminate and mechanical copying" of Soviet experience--even successful experience--may lead them to failures. However, "opposition to doctrinaireism has nothing in common with tolerance of revisionism." Conceding that Stalin and "former leaders in some socialist" countries had violated "socialist democracy," the statement rebukes those who on this ground would attempt to weaken the Communist dictatorship, or to retreat

from the Leninist doctrine of centralism in the party and state. In this part of the article, as in the earlier section on the "fundamental experience" of the USSR, Peiping is in essential agreement with the Soviet position. This part, like the earlier section, was directed primarily at elements in Eastern Europe who had already carried "liberalization" (Yugoslavia and Poland) beyond the limits drawn by Moscow and Peiping, or who might wish to carry it beyond those limits.

The final section of the article is addressed to the question of preserving bloc unity against the West, and proceeds from the proposition that all Communists "must continue to strengthen international proletarian solidarity with the Soviet Union as its center." The statement at this point affirms the Chinese advocacy of the independence of Communist parties, and offers a formula for maintaining their "unity" at the same time:

The Communist parties must seek unity with each other as well as maintain their respective independence. Historical experience proves that mistakes are bound to occur if there is not proper integration of these two aspects; if one or the other is neglected. Should the Communist parties maintain relations of equality among themselves and reach a common understanding and take concerted action, through genuine, not nominal, exchange of views, their unity will be strengthened. Conversely, if, in their mutual relations, one party imposes its views upon others, or if the parties use the method of interference in each other's internal affairs instead of comradely suggestion and criticism, their unity will be impaired....

The concept of "independence" of Communist parties necessarily presumes the organizational integrity of the various parties--that is, leadership and control of the party by native leaders, as was and is the case with the Chinese party, rather than by Soviet-imposed (or Chinese-imposed) puppets. While the Russians in various statements had recognized national "independence," only in the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June 1956 had there been any reference to party integrity. The profession in that document of "complete voluntariness" and "freedom" of action in interparty relations would presuppose each

SECRET

party's integrity, but this concept had not been subsequently stated by Moscow as a principle of party relations.

Peiping's statement again cautions against the error of "great-nation chauvinism" (still the principal problem) and the opposite error of narrow "nationalism":

'To strengthen the international solidarity of the socialist countries, each Communist party must respect the national interests and sentiments of other countries. This is of special importance for the Communist party of a larger country in its relations with that of a smaller country.... Stalin displayed certain great-nation chauvinist tendencies in relations with brother parties and countries. The essence of such tendencies lies in being unmindful of the independent and equal status of the Communist parties of various lands and that of the Socialist countries within the framework of the international bond of union.... But is not only great-nation chauvinism which hinders international proletarian unity. In the course of history, big countries have shown disrespect for small countries and have even oppressed them; and small countries have distrusted big ones and even become hostile to them. That is why...apart from the primary task of overcoming great-nation chauvinist tendencies in larger countries, it is also necessary to overcome nationalist tendencies in smaller countries.... (Peiping's leading theoretical journal, a week later, expanded this point to state that the "big country must take the lead and act as a model so that it can help in overcoming the comparatively small nation's nationalism.")

The statement goes on to express gratification that the Polish and Hungarian parties were "putting a firm check" on anti-Soviet activity in those countries. It further observes that Soviet foreign policy had "in the main" (not completely, but in the main), conformed to international Communist interests, and, following the 23 November Pravda reply to Tito, cites the Soviet-Yugoslavia communique's of 1955 and 1956, the Soviet declaration of 30 October, and the Soviet-Polish

SECRET

agreement of November, as evidence of the Soviet "determination...thoroughly to eliminate past mistakes in foreign relations."

The Soviet role in the publication of the Chinese pronouncement of 29 December is not known.

25X1

There would seem to be some advantage for Moscow in having an authoritative statement of the Soviet position come from the Chinese; that is, an emphasis on Soviet leadership of the bloc would come more tactfully from Peiping than from Moscow, and heretical or restive parties might be more inclined to accept correction from the 'disinterested' Chinese. The Kremlin clearly regarded the Chinese statement as very useful, especially at that time; Pravda and other Soviet journals reprinted the statement in its entirety, and there have since been many favorable references to it in the Soviet and satellite press. It is doubtful, however, that the Kremlin wished to have the Chinese pronouncement regarded as a fully authoritative statement of the Soviet as well as Chinese position. Several passages in the document could be used more effectively against Moscow, by other Communist states and parties, than anything the Russians themselves have written. It thus seems likely that Moscow, while warmly welcoming the statement at the time, was less than perfectly happy about its long-range implications.

#### Situation Before Chou En-lai's Trip, January 1957

Just before issuing the 29 December statement, Peiping announced that Premier Chou En-lai would cut short his Asian tour to visit Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest. Chou returned to Peiping for consultations before leaving for Moscow on 7 January.

25X1

The origins of Chou's trip are uncertain. There is a plausible report [redacted] that the occasion was made to order by an earlier invitation from the Poles to Mao Tse-tung to visit Warsaw.

25X1

25X1

Both Moscow and Peiping had made clear that their immediate objective was that of preventing any further deterioration in intrabloc relations--meaning that Chou's primary task, like the primary objective of the 29 December statement, would be that of arresting Gomulka's course and making clear to nationalist elements everywhere that Peiping had no sympathy whatever with "national Communism." The Chinese had also made clear, however, their view that certain problems in intrabloc relations were presented by Soviet behavior, even though these problems were less immediate than those posed by Eastern European deviation. Thus, Chou's trip would provide Peiping with an opportunity to reinforce its public pronouncements with some private counsel to the Kremlin as well as to Gomulka and others. In Chinese eyes, if not in Moscow's, Chou's role was almost certainly that of a conciliator and moderator, helping to keep quarrels in the family while urging restraint on all parties and encouraging them to work out the underlying problems gradually. A Chinese Communist youth magazine, discussing intrabloc relations shortly before Chou's trip, put the matter this way: "In a word, the contradictions within the socialist camp should be solved within itself. Household affairs should not be settled in the street."

Chinese points of agreement with Moscow--with respect both to theory and to the policies the Kremlin was actually pursuing--were clearly more important than the points of disagreement. The most important of these, for the immediate occasion of Chou's trip, was that problems of intrabloc relations must be subordinated to the interest of bloc unity, under Soviet leadership, against the West; the Chinese certainly approved Moscow's renewed emphasis on that point in its dealings with the Satellites. As a corollary, Peiping had agreed with Moscow on the need for military action against any state attempting to leave the bloc.

The Chinese had also lined up solidly with the Kremlin on the question of the general soundness of the Soviet state's course of development, and the related question of the applicability of the Soviet model for other Communist

SECRET

states. The Chinese almost certainly approved the trend, among Satellite parties, toward a tightening of organization and discipline and toward greater ideological orthodoxy. To the extent that this trend reflected Soviet dictation to these parties, however, the Chinese were in a dilemma, as Peiping's formula called for "independence" and noninterference.

The Russians and Chinese had also agreed on the nature, if not the degree, of Stalin's errors in internal affairs: personal dictatorship, an excessive reliance on terror, and too little regard for material welfare. Peiping, while not conceding that it had made comparable mistakes, had introduced certain changes paralleling the Soviet reforms after Stalin's death: the Chinese party had taken a few steps toward "collective leadership" at its 8th Congress, the regime was pursuing a modest "liberalization" program (including a policy of "leniency" toward unfriendly persons), and plans for industrial development had been somewhat modified in the interest of raising living standards. Thus the Chinese almost certainly approved the trend, in the Satellites, toward a greater appearance of collective leadership, reduced activity by the secret police, and the granting of economic concessions to the people; these policies had not been thoroughly applied, however, in the Satellites.

Peiping's points of divergence with Moscow, on internal affairs, were the Chinese belief that Stalin had not been given enough credit for the construction of the Soviet system, and, at the same time, the Chinese insistence that mistakes would still be made despite this generally sound system. The Chinese were no doubt pleased when, just prior to Chou's trip, Khrushchev at the Kremlin's New Year's eve party, praised Stalin. Khrushchev reportedly said that Stalin was a "great Marxist" and a "great fighter against imperialism." There had been no recent Soviet admission of continuing fallibility, however.

As for relations between Communist states, Moscow and Peiping had agreed on the principles: equality, (including mutual benefit), territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs. They had again agreed that Stalin and Stalinist figures in the Satellites had violated these principles. The Chinese clearly approved the recent trend of greater Soviet deference to Satellite sensibilities--such as Soviet agreements to discuss various questions with the Satellites, and Soviet treatment of Satellite officials

in a less dictatorial and superior manner--and the concurrent Soviet trend away from an exploitative economic relationship with the Satellites. The Chinese, however, had criticized past Soviet actions more strongly than had Moscow, Peiping had given greater emphasis to the theme that some mistakes had not yet been corrected, and Peiping had continued to specify "great-nation chauvinism" as the outstanding problem. Moreover, the Chinese had, reportedly in private and clearly in public, encouraged Gomulka to stand up for Leninist principles in intrabloc relations. The Chinese appeared to believe that the trend of Soviet policy, in this respect as in others, was correct but had not gone far enough.

With regard to relations between Communist parties, Moscow and Peiping had agreed on the need for "unity," which was to be achieved in part through exchanges of views, including friendly criticism, rather than interference. However, Moscow had been silent since June on the question of the independence (presupposing integrity) and "equality" of Communist parties. In contrast, Peiping's 29 December statement--the latest and most authoritative--had extolled "independence" as being just as important as "unity," and had described "equality" as the means for achieving unity. In so doing, Peiping was renewing its endorsement of the Polish party's repulse to Khrushchev when the latter attempted to interfere during the party plenum of October; also, the Chinese were essentially agreeing with Togliatti's concept of "autonomous" parties; finally, Peiping was indirectly agreeing even with Tito on the latter's point that organizational integrity of the Eastern European parties was a prerequisite for proper treatment by the Soviet party. The Chinese almost certainly approved the trend, since Stalin's death, of removing from Satellite parties various leaders imposed by Stalin, but again, as in relations between states, Peiping seemed to feel that the Kremlin had not gone far enough.

In sum, the Chinese seemed to approve the apparent effort of the Kremlin to establish its policy in Eastern Europe on some middle ground between the old Stalinist line and the mid-1956 high point of the more liberal post-Stalin approach. An important part of the Chinese effort in the 29 December statement had been to encourage the Kremlin to persist in this course and to suggest further areas for improvement.

Immediately prior to Chou's trip, there were three developments indicating how difficult it would be for Chou to get any of the main disputants to agree entirely with Peiping's views. At the end of December, the Yugoslav and Polish parties jointly affirmed that there are various paths to socialism and that bilateral relations represent the "most correct" form of co-operation between parties; the Soviets and Chinese had emphatically disagreed with the first contention, and Moscow had indicated disapproval of the second. Then on 6 January, following a meeting in Budapest, representatives of the governments and parties of the USSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania issued a communiqué taking a line opposite to the Yugoslav-Polish line. The meeting itself was a slap at the Yugoslav-Polish endorsement of bilateral relations, and the communiqué, while reaffirming the principles of the Soviet declaration of 30 October, in no way suggested that these principles were not already being completely observed. On 7 January, the Soviet and East German governments issued a communiqué endorsing the Soviet-Satellite statement of the previous day; the 7 December statement, while agreeing verbally with Peiping in professing the "equality" of Communist parties, avoided any suggestion of changes in the Soviet-East German relationship, probably the least satisfactory to Peiping of any in Eastern Europe.

It is very doubtful that the Chinese, being realists, expected Chou in one brief trip genuinely to resolve any of the abiding problems in intrabloc relations; he could reasonably hope only to move the parties in the right direction. As a moderator, Chou's course would presumably be that of emphasizing, in talks with Eastern European leaders, Peiping's position on orthodoxy and unity; and in talks with Soviet leaders, Peiping's position on the error of "great-nation chauvinism" and the desirability of party "independence." Knowing that the real problems would survive any rhetoric in the communiqués which might be devised by Chou and his opposite numbers in Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest, the obvious course for the Chinese, in such communiqués, would be to emphasize areas of agreement and to minimize areas of disagreement. It seemed possible, however, that the communiqués would reflect the degree of Chou's success in inducing the various parties to move any distance toward the Chinese position.

Chou En-lai's Trip

Chou En-lai began his tour on 7 and 8 January by meeting in Moscow with an East German delegation, concluding a brief joint statement endorsing the Soviet-GDR statement of 7 January and reaffirming the Sino-Germany treaty of friendship signed in 1955. Chou then met on 9 January with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders and with Kadar and Marosan of the Hungarian party. The joint statement emerging from the meeting expressed the intention of the three parties--and, by implication, the primary purpose of Chou's trip--as to "cut short with utmost resolution all attempts to weaken the unbreakable unity" (obviously weakened by Poland, and broken by Yugoslavia) of the bloc.

On the day before Chou's arrival in Warsaw, party leader Gomulka made an effort to minimize Poland's ideological conflict with the Sino-Soviet position. Gomulka emphasized in a 10 January statement that socialism cannot be something unique in each country, and that there are basic features common to all socialist countries; he added that introduction of the Yugoslav system into Poland would be as mistaken as slavish imitation of the Soviet model.

The pronouncements of Chou En-lai and Polish officials during the first three days of Chou's visit showed the expected Chinese emphasis on bloc solidarity and the expected Polish emphasis on sovereignty and equality. Immediately on arrival, Chou noted the "particularly great importance" of "strengthening the solidarity within the socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union...." Chou repeated this formulation--of Soviet leadership--in speeches during the next two days, and cited the Soviet-Polish agreement of 18 November as testimony that "all errors in mutual relations between socialist countries can be fully corrected through friendly talks." Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz (chairman of the Council of Ministers), in reply, acknowledged the need for "international proletarian solidarity" and Poland's membership in the "great family of socialist states," but declined to acknowledge Soviet leadership of the camp; similarly, they strongly implied that bloc solidarity would depend on continued Soviet recognition of "sovereignty and equal rights" as proclaimed in the Soviet-Polish statement.

In speeches during the next two days, Chou and Gomulka showed deference to each other's earlier points of emphasis.

In a 14 January speech, Chou praised the Polish party's "great courage and determination in correcting mistakes," and described it as fighting "with determination for the defense and development of socialism in Poland," while also reiterating that the USSR heads the Communist camp. The same day, Gomulka specified that the Polish party's greatest accomplishment during his leadership was the strengthening of national sovereignty, but praised the Soviet Union's "fraternal attitude" toward Poland, said forces friendly to Poland are "headed by the Soviet Union," and stated unequivocally that the "fate of Poland, its independence and security, its development and place in the world, are bound up with the camp of socialism." Chou on 15 January repeated his praise of the Polish party. The same day, a Polish official reaffirmed a "Polish road to socialism," but Gomulka himself spoke only of variety in "methods"; Gomulka in this speech expressed gratitude for the "deep understanding and support" of the Chinese Communist Party "primarily" among Communist parties, and gratitude that the Chinese "understand as we do the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

The Sino-Polish joint statement of 16 January, concluding Chou's visit, reflected the interest of both parties in emphasizing areas of agreement and minimizing areas of disagreement. The statement criticized Western policy in Europe and the Middle East, and affirmed support of the Kadar regime in Hungary, but did not contain any Polish endorsement of Soviet intervention in Hungary. Similarly, the statement denounced Western efforts to "sow dissension among socialist countries" and affirmed that their relations must be based on "proletarian internationalism," but did not mention the Soviet Union as head of the bloc. The statement affirmed that socialist countries are "independent and sovereign states" whose relations must also be based on the Leninist principles expressed in the USSR's 30 October declaration, Peiping's endorsement of that declaration on 1 November, and the Soviet-Polish agreement of 18 November.

With respect to internal affairs, the statement glossed over Polish deviations by affirming that the "basic principles of Marxism-Leninism should be applied, taking into consideration the concrete conditions...." The document reserved Peiping's position on Gomulka's domestic program by observing that Peiping supports Polish efforts to build socialism "in accordance with Leninist principles"--a formulation leaving Peiping free to assert later either that Gomulka was a "revisionist" or that Gomulka had done the best he could in the light of "concrete conditions." Chou refused to enlarge upon this point in a later press conference.

25X1

Chou stopped only one day in Budapest, where his mission seemed primarily that of illustrating Chinese endorsement of Soviet policy and the Kadar leadership. In Budapest, Chou publicly reiterated the Chinese line on Hungary by condemning both the "errors" of former leaders and Nagy's subsequent failure to resist "counterrevolution," praising Soviet intervention and the Kadar leadership, and asserting the Kremlin's determination to correct "mistakes" in past Soviet relations with Hungary. The joint communiqué reflected all these points, noting the "justified discontent" of the Hungarians over the "grave mistakes" of Rakosi and Gero (neither was named), hailing Soviet "support" for Kadar, reiterating the points of the Warsaw communiqué about both "proletarian internationalism" and the "Leninist basis of equality among nations," specifying the USSR as head of the camp (which the Warsaw statement had not done), and citing the 30 October (Soviet) and 1 November (Chinese) declarations as of "very great importance."

Chou returned to Moscow on the evening of 17 January, to hear another welcome statement on the question of Stalin's stature. Khrushchev publicly stated, at the reception for Chou, that the "term 'Stalinist,' like Stalin himself, is inseparable from the high title of Communist." Khrushchev went on to say that, with respect to defending Communism against its enemies, "may God grant that every Communist should be able to fight as Stalin fought."

The Sino-Soviet communique of 18 January showed the same approach as the Sino-Polish communique, that is, emphasizing areas of agreement and minimizing areas of disagreement. As the Chinese position had all along been much closer to the Soviet position than it had to the Polish position, the discussion in the 18 January communique revealed only small differences in emphasis from Peiping's 29 December statement, and fewer questions were evaded in the Sino-Soviet communique than in the Sino-Polish statement. However, the differences in emphasis and the omissions related to important points, almost certainly representing continuing problems.

The 18 January communique followed the organization of the other two published during Chou's trip by first surveying the world scene. Repeating the Sino-Soviet position on many international questions, the statement asserted that Moscow and Peiping enjoyed "complete unanimity" of views on these questions. There were, of course, many more such agreed positions in the Sino-Soviet statement than in the Sino-Polish statement.

The most important section of the 18 January communique dealt with means of achieving the "further consolidation of unity and co-operation between socialist countries." Like the Warsaw and Budapest communique's, the statement affirmed that intrabloc relations are based on Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism," and that, "at the same time," bloc members are "independent and sovereign states" whose relations must be based on "national equality." The USSR was not specified in the statement as head of the camp, but this seemed only tactful in a document of which Moscow was a signatory.

Observing, as often before, that problems of intrabloc relations must be subordinated to the struggle against the West, the communique indirectly warned that any fresh attempt by a bloc member to leave the bloc would again be met by military intervention. (Pravda later made this warning explicit.) The statement also took note of Western plans to exploit "chauvinism, narrow nationalist feelings and some survivals of national enmity" in order to split the bloc. This latter formulation reflected, although palely, the earlier Chinese line that "great-nation chauvinism" was the principal problem; it seems likely that Moscow would not have signed, and that Chou would not have asked Moscow to sign, a statement expressing

this criticism of the USSR as sharply as the Chinese had. (It is of some interest that Chou, in his 5 March report on his trip, referred again to the damage done the bloc by "great-nation chauvinism," rather than using the more vague term of the Moscow communique.)

The communique went on to observe, following the earlier Sino-Soviet line, that "Even if in the past there were some mistakes and shortcomings" in intrabloc relations, "at the present time they are being overcome and eliminated." This formulation lacked the emphasis of earlier Chinese statements on the point that mistakes have not yet been corrected, and did not admit at all, as the Chinese had earlier insisted, that mistakes were to be expected in the future.

The communique expressed confidence, as Moscow and Peiping had earlier, that any problem of intrabloc relations could be solved by "frank consultations and comradeship discussion." This formulation was less sharp than the earlier Chinese call for "genuine, not nominal, exchange of views." The statement repeated, without enlarging on, an earlier Chinese assertion that it is "fully possible" to combine the "unity" of bloc states with their "independence." Finally, like the Warsaw and Budapest communiquees, the statement cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October and Peiping's 1 November declaration endorsing it, and, unlike the two earlier communiquees, expressed "satisfaction" that intrabloc relations were indeed developing along the Leninist principles stated in those declarations.

Like the Warsaw communique, the Moscow statement evaded the question of the domestic program of bloc members, merely nodding to "Marxism-Leninism" as a guide. This double evasion probably represented a Sino-Soviet agreement for tactical reasons not to force the issue with Gomulka. It is conceivable, however, that there was and is some disagreement between Moscow and Peiping on this point. Chinese theoretical pronouncements are almost entirely in agreement with Moscow's on the "laws" of a Communist state, by which criteria Gomulka was and is impermissibly unorthodox. Nevertheless, the Chinese themselves have a long record of flexibility, and Chou's trip may have made Peiping more aware of complications in Poland and more willing than Moscow to allow Gomulka room for maneuver. Chou evaded the issue again in his

5 March report, praising Gomulka for both correcting mistakes of "doctrinairism" and combatting mistakes of "revisionism," without specifying which policies were which.

A central point in the Chinese formula for "unity" among bloc members, as expressed in the 29 December statement, had been the need for Communist parties as well as states to maintain their "independence." The 18 January communiqué said nothing about relations between Communist parties. Neither had the Warsaw and Budapest communiqués, which were also issued as agreements primarily between governments rather than parties. However, on 17 January the Soviet theoretical journal, Kommunist, in a discussion of socialism and "proletarian internationalism," affirmed that Communist parties, as well as states, are "independent and do not interfere in each other's internal affairs." This represented some accommodation to the Chinese position, although the Chinese had said not that the parties "are" independent but that they should be.

The three communiqués issued during Chou's trip did not appear to indicate any alteration of the Chinese Communist position as expressed in the 29 December statement. Differences between the 29 December statement and all three of the communiqués in part reflected the fact that the latter were bilateral diplomatic statements rather than unilateral theoretical pronouncements. Beyond this, differences between the 29 December statement and the three communiqués, and among the three communiqués themselves (particularly between the Warsaw and Moscow statements) appeared to reflect continuing differences among the three parties. There still seemed to be a wide difference between Warsaw and Peiping, a wider difference between Warsaw and Moscow, and some difference between Peiping and Moscow with respect to Poland and to intra-bloc relations in general.

Although the three communiqués permit no firm judgment as to what Chou actually accomplished on his trip, there were indications of some little success. The Warsaw communiqué suggested that Chou might have influenced Gomulka toward moving closer to Moscow, at least in foreign affairs. The Budapest communiqué was unrevealing. The Moscow communiqué did not reveal whether Chou had pressed Peiping's earlier assertion of continuing Communist fallibility, but the statement showed some small accommodation to the Chinese admonitions about "great-nation chauvinism," and the Kommunist article suggested some receptivity, if only at the verbal level, to the Chinese point about

SECRET

the independence of Communist parties. The most important feature and effect of all three communiqués seemed to be the emphatic commitment of Chinese prestige to Soviet observance of the principles expressed in various Soviet and Chinese pronouncements on intrabloc relations.

#### Developments Following Chou's Trip

From Chou En-lai's departure from Moscow on 18 January to the time of this writing (early April), several developments have shown that the problems in intrabloc relations to which the Chinese addressed themselves remain very much alive. A Chinese moderating influence may be reflected in the recent improvement in Soviet-Polish relations, but there is no evidence of such influence on either party in the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute. Neither has there been any visible Chinese effect on relations between the Kremlin and the other six Eastern European states.

From mid-January to mid-February there was a deterioration in Soviet-Polish relations. The Kommunist article of 17 January was an indirect attack on Gomulka as well as a direct attack on Tito, and the Satellite press followed up with direct attacks on Poland. As of early February, Warsaw was on its good behavior; one official editorial hailed recent intrabloc agreements as proving that "there are no insoluble contradictions between socialist countries," and said that all problems could be solved "in the spirit of proletarian internationalism." However, the official Polish press soon entered the dispute with the bloc (only the unofficial press had carried on polemics previously), charging bloc media with irresponsibility. In the same period, the Soviet Union was suspected of giving covert support to Polish Stalinists who opposed Gomulka. Finally, there were some indications of stronger Soviet opposition to Gomulka's efforts to improve relations with the West and to seek credits and assistance from that direction. (16)

Peiping, which did not reprint bloc press attacks on Poland, almost certainly was displeased with Soviet policies having the effect of pushing Gomulka farther away from the rest of the bloc. Although there is no direct evidence of renewed Chinese representations on Gomulka's behalf, Chinese influence has conceivably been reflected in developments since mid-February tending to reverse the trend of deterioration in Soviet-Polish relations. Khrushchev on 19 February publicly praised Gomulka for working for socialism in Poland and for co-operation with other

Communist countries, and also remarked that the USSR would do its best to develop Poland as "an equal and independent socialist state." Similarly, Khrushchev was reported to have given private assurances to Gomulka that ideological criticism of Poland would cease (17). There have in fact been considerably fewer polemics against Poland--although they have not ceased--in the Soviet press since that time.

Gomulka in late February and early March took some measures which probably pleased the Kremlin, and the Chinese as well. These entailed the curbing of the anti-Soviet Polish press and an easing of pressure on the most pro-Soviet elements of the Polish party. Chou En-lai in his 5 March report praised Gomulka for "promoting Poland's relations with other Socialist countries, above all with the Soviet Union." Since that date, Gomulka has endorsed the Kadar regime in Hungary, and the Polish party's ideological journal has warned against using the term "national Communism."

On 17 January (the day before Chou left Moscow), the Kommunist article which asserted the "independence" of Communist parties also strongly attacked--indeed, was devoted primarily to attacking--the concept of "national Communism" and its embodiment in Yugoslavia. Like the Chinese statement of 29 December, the Kommunist article laid out the issues and in effect denied to the Yugoslavs the name of Communists.

Peiping could have had no quarrel with the content of the Kommunist article, and Chou had not made a visit to Belgrade. However, a Chinese Communist delegation was in Yugoslavia at the time, and the Chinese apparently wished Chou's conciliatory line to apply to Belgrade as well. Interviewed in India on 24 January, Chou said that his trip had "helped to improve and re-establish happy and good relations" among bloc members, and specified that he would "surely" include Yugoslavia among the socialist states. Then on 27 January, Peng Chen, a CCP politburo member ranking only a few slots below Chou, and head of the Chinese delegation which had been in Yugoslavia for two weeks, publicly minimized the Sino-Soviet differences with Belgrade. Peng observed that "it is no wonder that there are certain differences over certain questions among fraternal parties and countries," and asserted that these differences "usually occur over comparatively minor and secondary questions."

On 12 February Soviet foreign minister Shepilov stated that the future development of all Soviet-Yugoslav relations was contingent on a change in Belgrade's ideological attitude. Belgrade replied sharply, stating that the Yugoslav position remained unchanged, and that further development of relations would depend on the Soviet attitude. In the same period, the Belgrade press reported that Moscow, in economic negotiations, had retreated from some previous agreements on the development of Yugoslav industry. On 26 February, Yugoslav foreign minister Popovic made the most incendiary remarks of the year, declaring that the USSR was wasting its time if it still hoped to see Belgrade in its "socialist camp." Popovic charged that Stalinism in postwar years had inflicted "incomparably greater damage to the cause of socialism than all of the imperialist conspiracies put together."

The Peiping press did not join this Soviet-Yugoslav exchange, and in his 5 March report Chou En-lai obliquely criticized the conduct of the dispute. Reiterating that unanimity among socialist states can be reached gradually through comradely discussion, Chou observed that, in the meantime, it would be proper to "reserve the differences while upholding our solidarity."

Chou's advice apparently went unheeded. Pravda on 11 March denounced Popovic's statements, describing his remark about Stalinism as a "monstrous deduction." Although the Pravda article called upon Yugoslav "statesmen" (rather than other possible descriptions) to strive to remove and not to exacerbate existing differences, the article nowhere spoke of Yugoslav leaders as "comrades," which had been the Soviet and Chinese practice since the 1955 rapprochement. Then on 27 March, Bulganin made the sharpest explicit accusation against Belgrade since Stalin's death, charging Yugoslavia with having given the Nagy government in Hungary practical as well as verbal support during the revolutionary days of October-November.

The Chinese, in contrast, were still taking a conciliatory line toward Belgrade in late March. Peng Chen, in his 31 March report on his trip, included Yugoslavia in the socialist camp and again minimized differences in opinion among members of the camp. In the same period, Liu Shao-chi sent a message of congratulations to the President of the Yugoslav Assembly on his re-election.

With respect to the Satellites, the Kremlin had already, prior to Chou's trip, been treating them with comparative generosity in economic affairs, having agreed since November to provide them with about \$600,000,000 in additional credits, having canceled some large debts, and having concluded some apparently favorable trade agreements. Any effects of Chou's trip on the Satellites could thus be reflected only in political affairs. There has been no good evidence of such effects.

The communique issued by the Soviet and Czech party delegations on 1 February--a good occasion for offering a revised Soviet formula on interparty relations--did not mention the concept of party "independence" advocated by the Chinese and endorsed by Kommunist. The communique instead emphasized "proletarian internationalism," denounced "national Communism," and asserted the "equality" (as sometimes before) of Communist parties. (The Chinese Communist party newspaper hailed the Soviet-Czech talks as illustrating the "new type" of intrabloc co-operation, without explaining what was new about it.) The Soviet-Bulgarian party declaration of 20 February also emphasized "proletarian internationalism," and did not mention even the "equality" of parties, let alone their independence.

As for Satellite internal affairs, there has been one mildly encouraging development, in terms of professed principles. Three of Ulbricht's former opponents, two of whom had been purged for ideological deviation, were taken into the party central committee in February. However, Ulbricht's long report to the central committee plenum in early February showed no disposition to relax repressive measures against the populace.

It is not known whether the Chinese have been influencing the Soviet view as to whether some central organization such as the Comintern or Cominform should be re-established to supervise or to guide contacts between Communist parties. There is an unconfirmed press report (18) that the Chinese, with the Polish and Italian parties, have opposed the re-establishment of such a body. The first Soviet comment on the matter in 1957--in Kommunist--quoted Togliatti as being opposed to any return to a central organization, but left the Soviet position open. Discussions about the creation of an international Communist organization are said to be in progress now among the Communist parties of Europe and Asia.

In any case, the Chinese have clearly favored increased contacts among Communist parties, including bilateral contacts. Such contacts would reduce the value to Moscow of any central organization for direction of Communist parties. That is, bilateral contacts permit a generally faithful party, such as the Chinese, to differ sometimes from the Soviet party's line in talks with other party leaders, and permit suspect or hostile parties, such as the Polish and Yugoslav parties, further to encourage each other in defiance of the Kremlin.

#### Chinese Communist Course of Action

The most important developments in Sino-Soviet relations in the past year have certainly been Peiping's public disagreement with the Kremlin (for the first time) over various features of the de-Stalinization campaign, and the Chinese role, in speech and in action, in relations between the USSR and Eastern European states. This is not to say that the Kremlin, in having contributed so heavily to Peiping's prestige in the past year, has been Frankenstein building a monster. The relationship between Moscow and Peiping clearly remains that of elder brother and younger brother, with the younger admiring the elder, modeling himself on him, generally approving his actions, and acting as a partner in his projects. As Peng Chen observed at a Moscow press conference on 1 December, "We say that the members of the family of socialist nations are equal, but we all call the Soviet Union our elder brother."

It is just as clear, however, that younger brother's voice has been changing, that his manner has become more confident (verging sometimes on insolence), and that he believes his own opinion on family matters to be worth something. He has even defined the elder brother's position in the family. Again in Peng Chen's words, in the spirit of the long statement of 29 December: "What should be the relations between old and young? Not what they were, for example, in Chinese families under the feudal system, when the old domineered over the young. I would liken the elder brother in our family of nations to the presiding member of the family council. He may advise how best this or that may be done, support the younger members and not allow them to stumble...."

It is certainly proper, in Chinese eyes, for there to be a closer approximation to "equality" between the elder brother and the second brother (i.e., China) than between

SECRET

elder brother and baby brother (e.g., Albania). Nevertheless, the Chinese view does not appear to be as cynical as the slogan of Animal Farm--all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others--which described a relationship between masters and slaves, not among members of a family. The Chinese seem genuinely to think in terms of a family, in which each member should be self-respecting and be shown respect. The Chinese Communist themselves have a great deal of self-respect, they have supported Gomulka in his efforts to achieve the conditions of self-respect for a Communist regime (freedom from Soviet control), and they have approved this feature even of Tito's behavior.

The question of degrees of "equality" in family relations is inseparable from the question of discipline. That is, what should the senior members do when the younger disobey them on a critical matter? In the 1 December interview, Peng also offered a comment on that point: "And if a younger brother does not want to listen to him, well let him do as he thinks best. Sooner or later he will learn to appreciate the elder brother's advice and be grateful to him." The 29 December statement, like Peiping's endorsement of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, made clear that the Chinese do not believe that tolerance should extend to the point where younger brother falls in the fire or is eaten by dogs, but on the other hand Peiping's behavior in the past year suggests a greater degree of Chinese tolerance than the Kremlin now thinks advisable.

Moscow might well agree with Peiping on the ideal of the bloc as a happy family, united in general objectives, with each member voluntarily adhering to the family code of conduct, and with the occasionally erring members returning to righteousness when their mistakes are pointed out to them. This concept is close to that of the "great commonwealth of socialist nations" stated as an existing fact, rather than as an ideal, in the Kremlin's 30 October declaration. However, the Kremlin would almost certainly argue that its steps toward such an ideal--the relationships with Eastern European states evolving between the time of Stalin's death and mid-1956--turned out to be too rapid, that Hungary in fact did fall in the fire and Poland is still playing dangerously close.

The Chinese position on intrabloc relations--which, as it applies to the USSR, advocates a greater degree of adherence to professed principles than has been or is yet the case--implies a belief that the forces of individualism and

SECRET

nationalism in Eastern Europe can be made to work generally for the bloc. Such a belief would presumably derive from Chinese Communist successes in China and, perhaps, from Peiping's relationship with the Viet Minh regime. The comparative success of the Communists in containing and directing the forces of individualism and nationalism in China--compared, that is, with Eastern Europe--has been noted in earlier sections of this paper. The same relative success has been evident in Peiping's brotherly relationship with the Communist movement in the long anti-Chinese country of Indochina. For several years Peiping has been the Viet Minh's principal benefactor and closest friend, and Chinese influence has been exerted with the declared intention of avoiding the error of "great-nation chauvinism" committed by the USSR in Eastern Europe. There is no evidence of a Chinese effort to compromise the organizational integrity of Ho's party; it has been stable under its nativist leaders. The several thousand Chinese advisers and technicians in North Vietnam were sent there explicitly to assist Ho Chi Minh in "his leadership" (19). The Viet Minh, guided like the CCP by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, have willingly adopted distinctively Chinese methods in building a Communist regime, and they have apparently not been pressed to duplicate all Chinese policies. At the same time, in exchange for substantial Chinese military and economic aid (and a smaller amount of Soviet aid) the Viet Minh have been obliged to subordinate certain immediate objectives to Sino-Soviet international objectives. This was true in 1954 when Ho negotiated a settlement with the French despite his favorable military prospects, and it is true now in Ho's acceptance of the policy of moving toward unification through a rapprochement between the two Vietnamese states. The Chinese may regard their relationship with the Viet Minh--or the joint Sino-Soviet relationship with the Viet Minh--as, on balance, a model for relations between large and small members of the bloc family.

It is uncertain, however, whether the Chinese Communist success in China and with the Viet Minh is applicable to Eastern Europe. The forces of individualism and nationalism in China, and of anti-Chinese feeling in Vietnam, in both of which countries grievances tend to be primarily economic rather than political in nature, may be much less strong than those forces in Eastern Europe. It is an open question as to whether the forces of individualism and nationalism in Eastern Europe can be contained and effectively exploited, or anti-Russian feeling there be weakened, by any combination of concessions open to the Kremlin and to Eastern European regimes so long as they intend such regimes to remain both Communist states and members of the bloc.

SECRET

It may be argued that the Chinese are urging their line on intrabloc relations, on matters for which they are not directly responsible and cannot lose face, simply to challenge Soviet leadership of the bloc, with the aim of eventually displacing the Kremlin. However, the Chinese record of fidelity to Moscow makes it most unlikely that Peiping is behaving cynically toward the Kremlin. The Chinese, partly in their own interest, have almost certainly been trying to help their elder brother, not to make him look like a rascal or a fool. If the Chinese view--either long-range or short-range--of proper intrabloc relations is in fact not feasible, Peiping has almost certainly urged this view out of ignorance rather than guile. While intrabloc relations may conceivably become complicated by a developing Chinese ambition, at this time the possibility of significant developments seems to lie not in competition between the partners but in the tension between the actual problems facing the Kremlin and the apparent Chinese view of feasible policies. (It should be understood that there is no prospect of the Sino-Soviet alliance itself foundering on any issue or combination of issues in Eastern Europe. There is no reason to doubt the reiterated profession of Chinese Communist leaders that they regard the maintenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance as their "supreme international duty." In terms of Sino-Soviet relations, questions of intrabloc relations seem to offer merely the possibility of a Sino-Soviet dispute which might leave some ill feeling and prepare the ground for other disputes which could eventually place a significant strain on the alliance. The more important question, at this time, is that of the amount of trouble Peiping might make for the Kremlin by its role in Eastern European affairs.)

Having invited or accepted Chinese assistance in preventing a further deterioration in intrabloc relations, Moscow cannot reasonably expect Peiping henceforth to confine itself to Asian affairs. The Chinese clearly do intend to play a continuing role with respect to Eastern Europe. At least for the time being, Peiping appears to see its role in much the same terms as it did before Chou En-lai's trip. In his 5 March report, Chou stated the Chinese view of bloc family relationships (including the question of how best to work out disputes) in the following fashion:

There are no essential contradictions or clashes of interests between the socialist states...; solidarity and mutual help has always been the main and fundamental aspect....We cannot say

that all has been perfect and normal in their mutual relations. Great-nation chauvinism and narrow nationalist tendencies have given rise to a certain amount of estrangement and misunderstanding...., but now these shortcomings and mistakes are being corrected....

All the socialist countries take Marxism-Leninism as their guiding philosophy. This does not mean that all socialist countries... have also identical views on all questions at all times. Compared with the main aspect of our unanimity on principles, our differences on certain questions are, after all, of secondary importance. Moreover, these differences can be resolved, and...unanimity can be reached gradually through comradely discussion and consultation. Even if no unanimity can be reached for the time being, it would also be normal to reserve the differences while upholding our solidarity.

With respect to those Soviet internal affairs on which Peiping has felt free to offer comment, Moscow and Peiping are largely in accord on the question of the stature of Stalin, but less closely in accord on the question of the stature of Stalin's successors. Khrushchev's several public remarks about Stalin in recent months have brought the Kremlin close to the position which Peiping has taken since its first comment last April. There is still very little Soviet accommodation, however, to the reiterated Chinese contention that any Communist party, operating even the most admirable system, will continue to make mistakes. Although the Chinese would presumably welcome a Soviet admission of continuing fallibility (which would apply to Soviet policies in all fields), it seems doubtful that Peiping will press for it. The Chinese may choose simply to make this point, again and again, in their public pronouncements, so that the point will not be lost on the Kremlin even if not conceded by it.

In Chinese eyes, the most important complex of problems at this time is almost certainly presented by Yugoslavia and Poland, rather than by the six other Eastern European states which are still fully satellites. That is, "socialist" unity is most impaired by the independent Yugoslavs and most threatened by the partially independent Poles, and Peiping agrees with Moscow that bloc unity is the most immediate

concern. The Chinese, like the Russians, see problems in both the internal and foreign policies of Yugoslavia and Poland, and seem to see another problem in the Soviet approach to these problems.

Neither Yugoslavia nor Poland embodies all or even most of the "laws" of Communist states. In only two categories do they meet or largely meet the declared Sino-Soviet standard--the character of the party, and the form of the state. Both parties seem to qualify as Leninist, with collective leaderships (i.e., as nearly so as the CCP), relying more on persuasion than on purges in party affairs. Both states are dictatorships, and, moreover, are effective dictatorships (as the Soviet and Chinese states are), in the sense that they are not maintained by the presence or threat of foreign military forces. (However, the Polish party has a serious problem of factionalism, and the Gomulka regime permits a possibly hazardous degree of freedom.) Both the Yugoslavs and the Poles deviate seriously with regard to key economic policies. While both have nationalized industry, the Yugoslavs have introduced the concept of "worker management" and the Poles are experimenting with it. Both Belgrade and Warsaw have moved away from agricultural collectivization and both have only loose economic planning. More important, Belgrade differs sharply with the bloc concept of "proletarian internationalism," and Warsaw does not agree entirely. For the Yugoslavs, "proletarian internationalism" involves recognition of differences between Communist regimes and consequently "unity" only on points of genuine agreement; Belgrade dislikes all blocs, and wishes to be friendly with the West as well as other Communist states; it regards Western democratic socialism not as heresy but as a genuine part of the forward movement of "socialism" throughout the world. The Poles prefer the "five principles" to "proletarian internationalism"; they in general follow the Soviet position on foreign affairs (Gomulka has said publicly that the facts of geography determine his foreign policy), but not so closely as do the six orthodox satellites; for example, Warsaw wishes to have relations with Western socialists, and is less hostile to the United States and Western Europe than are Moscow, Peiping and the satellites.

Awkwardly for Peiping as well as for Moscow, these two least reliable states and parties in Eastern Europe--the Yugoslav and Polish--are also those whose relations with the USSR most nearly meet the stated Sino-Soviet position on the

principles of relations between states and parties of the bloc. When discussing states, Moscow and Peiping call for observance of the principles (in the usual order) of equality (including mutual benefit), territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs. When applied to parties, the position calls for the "independence" of parties, their "equality" as expressed in genuine exchanges of views, and "comradely criticism" rather than interference. These concepts are all related and imply one another, and, to the degree that any Communist regime (party and state) meets this declared standard in its relations with Moscow, it cannot be a simple satellite.

Soviet-Yugoslav state and party relations meet the declared standard on all counts, because Tito has insisted on it, and Soviet-Polish relations meet the standard on most counts, because Gomulka has insisted on it. The Yugoslav and Polish states and parties are under the control of native leaders with some party and popular support, and can take action independently of Moscow. Polish freedom is more qualified than is Yugoslavia's, due to Polish membership in the Warsaw pact and CEMA, the presence of 35,000 Soviet troops in Poland, and the stated intention of the USSR to take military action to prevent any fresh attempt to secede from the bloc; but Poland is not a satellite in the same sense as the remaining six Eastern European states. There is no Soviet economic exploitation of either Yugoslavia or Poland at this time, and there is no known territorial issue now. Yugoslav and Polish state and party leaders have genuine discussions with the Kremlin, rather than being summoned to Moscow to receive orders. Finally, there is "comradely criticism" (sometimes rising to polemics) in both directions, although the Russians may be reinforcing their criticism by giving covert support to Gomulka's opponents.

Peiping clearly intends to continue its contacts with the Polish party, and probably means to increase them with the Yugoslavs. Polish premier Cyrankiewicz is now (11 April) near the end of a visit to Communist China; in a joint statement of 11 April, Peiping reaffirmed its support of Gomulka as an individual and its gratification over Polish party achievements since October, and the two regimes agreed to consult each other on important problems. Peiping Radio has also quoted Cyrankiewicz as stating that Mao Tse-tung would soon be visiting Warsaw; the importance such a visit would have is emphasized by the fact that Mao's only known trip outside China was to Moscow in the winter of 1949-50 for the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty. Peiping may intend to

conclude a less ambitious treaty with Warsaw. As for Yugoslavia, Chou En-lai told a Polish newsmen in Moscow in January that he intended sometime to visit Yugoslavia, and there is an unconfirmed press report from Belgrade that the visit will take place in June. A low-level Yugoslav delegation is to visit Peiping in May for the announced purpose of signing a cultural agreement.

The Kremlin may regard the prospect of increased Sino-Polish and Sino-Yugoslav relations with mixed feelings. Moscow can almost certainly rely on Peiping to contend, in its talks with the Poles and Yugoslavs, that the proper use of Belgrade's freedom and Warsaw's more limited freedom lies in voluntary adherence to the "laws" of Communist states, especially to the concept of "proletarian internationalism." However, Peiping's own history and Chou's recent trip may have made the Chinese more sympathetic than Moscow about the internal problems which prevent Gomulka from adhering to these "laws." Of greater importance, increased Polish contacts with Peiping may conflict with a Soviet effort to bring Gomulka down. Similarly, increased Yugoslav contacts with the Chinese may conflict with a Soviet effort--which seemed to be under way as of early April--to isolate Belgrade from members of the "socialist camp." Indeed, the publicly stated Chinese recommendation that differences among socialist states be "reserved" suggests that Peiping would advise the Yugoslavs against taking actions--which Moscow may hope they will take--that would promote the isolation of Belgrade. Moreover, the Chinese may intend to take up these same matters directly with Moscow, contending that Gomulka intends to keep Poland a Communist state within the bloc and that "national Communism" does not imminently menace any other bloc member, and that the Kremlin therefore should not attempt to subvert Gomulka and should not engage in polemics with the Yugoslavs. This is not to say that Peiping cannot be persuaded that Gomulka is a bad risk and that Tito is hopelessly unregenerate, and that strong action is necessary against one or both; but the Chinese do not appear to believe any of these possible contentions at this time.

While the Chinese Communists seem currently less concerned with the six orthodox Eastern European states than with Yugoslavia and Poland, the factors that led to the Kremlin's troubles with Yugoslavia in 1948 and with Poland and Hungary in 1956 are present in varying degrees in Hungary now and in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania as well. Peiping, in its own interest as well as what it views as Moscow's interest, has probably been examining the Soviet relationship with the six remaining Satellites.

As the Kremlin has shaped the Satellites since their inception, all of them at least formally embody the "laws" of Communist states. All of them are operated by Leninist parties, although some have merely the appearance of collective leadership and some may rely too strongly on purges. All of them are dictatorships, and are effective in the sense that none seems about to be overthrown. All are pursuing the key economic policies of nationalization of industry, step-by-step collectivization of agriculture, and long-range planning. All are enthusiastic adherents of "proletarian internationalism." However, most of these regimes seem to be failures when compared with the Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav or Polish regimes; that is, most appear to depend for their continued existence in large part either on the presence of Soviet forces (350,000 in East Germany, 60,000 in Hungary, 35,000 in Rumania) (20), or on the fear of Soviet military intervention.

Because these six Eastern European states can still be correctly described as Satellites, their relations with the USSR do not meet the professed principles for relations between states and parties of the bloc. The principles which come nearest to representing the facts are "territorial integrity" and "mutual benefit," in the limited sense of current territorial issues and economic relationships. Other terms of the formula--relating to the "independence" and "equality" of states and parties, and "noninterference" in their affairs--are far from the facts. Although the Kremlin has made an increasing effort in recent years to give an impression of observing professed principles in Soviet-Satellite relations, these principles would be meaningful only if the Satellite régimes were in a position to take action on a major matter independently of Moscow, as can Peiping, Belgrade and (on some matters) Warsa". All of the Satellite states and parties are Soviet creatures, imposed on Eastern European countries by the Kremlin; none of these regimes could exist without various kinds of Soviet support, and for this reason if no other they cannot be independent. Thus the distinction between nativist leaders and leaders whose first allegiance is to Moscow--a real distinction when applied to Communist China, Yugoslavia and Poland--is probably academic when applied to the Satellites. The leaders of these six Satellites seem to be compelled to give their allegiance primarily to Moscow in order to stay in power, and to regard their interests as almost identical with Moscow's. While there is probably a little genuine discussion between Soviet and Satellite leaders, no doubt the Kremlin has been able

to impose its will in these discussions. Moreover, Soviet control of the secret police and security forces in the Satellites (not the case in China, Yugoslavia and Poland) has enabled the Kremlin to ensure that its orders are carried out. The dependent status and subservient character of the Satellites are illustrated by the absence of any "comradely criticism" of the USSR by these regimes, in contrast to the more spirited behavior of Peiping, Belgrade (especially) and Warsaw.

It should not be assumed that the Chinese, perceiving that Satellite relations with the USSR do not meet the declared standard, will rush to correct injustice. There is no evidence that any Satellite leader, at this time, regards his party and state as suffering injustice at Soviet hands, and it seems doubtful that the Chinese would make representations on anyone's behalf without being asked. However, the conclusion of a Sino-Czech treaty of friendship and co-operation, during Premier Siroky's visit to Peiping in March, may in part represent Chinese preparation for a larger role in Soviet-Satellite affairs as well as the bloc's relations with Warsaw and Belgrade. The treaty, very similar to the treaty concluded with the East German regime in December 1955, pledges the parties to consult each other on all important questions affecting their interests; with a similar provision in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, Peiping now has a formal basis for intervening with the Russians, the Czechs and the East Germans on problems in their relations with each other.

Beyond the question of complaints by any Satellite leader, there is the question of whether the Chinese will make any representations to Moscow about the leadership of Satellite states and parties. The Chinese may believe that there are potential leaders in some Satellites, like Gomulka in Poland, who could gain greater party support, who could effectively exploit popular forces rather than devote their energies primarily to repressing them, and who would move their states and parties to that position of greater autonomy which Peiping seems to think is to the long-range interests of the bloc. (The Chinese may consider, for example, that there are feasible alternatives to the Soviet-imposed and very unpopular Ulbricht and his lieutenants in East Germany.) There would seem to be a particularly good opportunity for Chinese action if factionalism in any Satellite party were to increase, and there were Soviet pressure to retain an unwanted leader (like Rakosi in spring 1956) or to impose someone no better

~~SECRET~~

(like Gero in July 1956). The Chinese are probably vulnerable, however, to the argument that, for considerations of stability, changes in the leadership of Satellite states and parties are not feasible at this time. (For example, the Kremlin would probably contend that Ulbricht's removal, while strengthening the East German party and reducing popular hatred of the regime, would set off the same cycle as in Hungary, particularly in view of German sentiment for reunification.) Peiping's agreement with Moscow that the "unity" of the bloc is the paramount consideration at this time enables the Russians to take the reasonable line, with the Chinese, that they are in agreement as to the ideal, but that Eastern European conditions--about which they are better informed than the Chinese--make the evolution of a "socialist commonwealth" a very long-term objective rather than an early prospect.

The only positive conclusion permissible at this time is that there is a new factor in Eastern European affairs--the Chinese Communists--which Moscow cannot control. Peiping has more clearly emerged as a second, even if clearly secondary, center of Communist ideology. Chinese pronouncements have provided a basis for Gomulka and Tito to look for continuing Chinese support on the issue of autonomy (if nothing else) and for other Eastern European Communists to look for support, in efforts to achieve a greater degree of autonomy, not merely to the heretical Yugoslavs or the suspect Poles but to the orthodox and highly regarded Chinese. While the Chinese view their role in intrabloc relations as serving the Kremlin's best interests as well as Peiping's, the Kremlin can have no assurance that Peiping will play its role in the manner Moscow would wish.

**Page Denied**